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ABSTRACT

This teacher resource text and student text are part of a continuing series on current and historical international issues, placing special emphasis on the importance of educating students in their participatory role as citizens. It steps back from the day-to-day turmoil in Russia to examine the issues that most deeply affect the United States. At the core of the unit are four distinct options for U.S. policy. Each option contains a different perspective on the threats and opportunities presented by conditions in Russia. The background reading provides students with the knowledge needed to take part in the debate on the U.S. role in Russia's post-Cold War transition. Part 1 offers an historical overview of U.S. relations with the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. Part 2 surveys the economic and political changes that Russia has undergone since the Soviet collapse, with special attention given to Russia's evolving foreign policy. Part 3 concentrates on the leading challenges facing U.S. policymakers with respect to Russia and its neighbors. An optional reading features an excerpt from a Soviet-era textbook. Includes five- and three-day lesson plans. (BB)

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Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy.

Teacher's Resource Book [and Student Book].

Public Policy Debate in the Classroom: Choices for the 21st Century Education Project.

4th Edition.

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Teacher's Resource Book

Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy



PUBLIC POLICY DEBATE IN THE CLASSROOM

Choices for the 21st Century Education Project

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Institute for International Studies

Brown University

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Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy is part of a continuing series on current foreign policy issues. New units are published each academic year, and all units are updated regularly.

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CHOICES

for the 21st Century Education Project
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The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project develops curricula on current and historical international issues and offers workshops, institutes, and in-service programs for high school teachers. Course materials place special emphasis on the importance of educating students in their participatory role as citizens.

The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project is a program of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University.

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The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project is a program of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Choices was established to help citizens think constructively about foreign policy issues, to improve participatory citizenship skills, and to encourage public judgment on policy priorities.

The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies was established at Brown University in 1986 to serve as a forum for students, faculty, visiting scholars, and policy practitioners, who are committed to studying global problems and developing international initiatives to benefit society.

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About the Choices Approach

Choices for the 21st Century curricula are designed to make complex international issues understandable and meaningful for students. Using an innovative approach to student-centered instruction, Choices units develop critical thinking and civic judgment — essential ingredients of responsible citizenship.

Understanding the Significance of History: Each Choices unit provides students with a thorough introduction to the topic under consideration. Students gain an understanding of the historical background and the status of current issues. In this way, they see how history has shaped our world. With this foundation, students are prepared to thoughtfully consider a variety of perspectives on public policy.

Exploring Policy Alternatives: Each Choices unit is built around a framework of alternative policy options that challenges students to consider multiple perspectives and to think critically about the issue at hand. Students are best able to understand and analyze the options through a cooperative learning/role-play activity. In groups, students explore their assigned options and plan short presentations. The setting of the role-play may be a Congressional hearing, meeting of the National Security Council, or an election campaign forum. Student groups defend their policy options and, in turn, are challenged with questions from their classmates. The ensuing debate demands analysis and evaluation of the many conflicting values, interests, and priorities reflected in the options.

Exercising Civic Judgment: Armed with fresh insights from the role-play and debate, students are challenged to articulate original, coherent policy options that reflect their own values, priorities, and goals as individuals and citizens. Students' views can be expressed in letters to Congress or the White House, editorials for the school or community newspaper, persuasive speeches, or visual presentations.

Why Use the Choices Approach? Choices curricula are informed by current educational research about how students learn best. Studies have consistently demonstrated that students of all abilities learn best when they are actively engaged with the material rather than listening passively to a lecture. Student-centered instructional activities motivate students and develop higher-order thinking skills. However, some high school educators find the transition from lecture format to student-centered instruction difficult. Lecture is often viewed as the most efficient way to cover the required material. Choices curricula offer teachers a flexible resource for covering course material while actively engaging students and developing skills in critical thinking, persuasive writing, and informed citizenship. The instructional activities that are central to Choices units can be valuable components in any teacher's repertoire of effective teaching strategies. Each Choices unit includes student readings, a framework of policy options, suggested lesson plans, and resources for structuring cooperative learning, role-plays, and simulations. Students are challenged to:

- recognize relationships between history and current issues
- analyze and evaluate multiple perspectives on an issue
- understand the internal logic of a viewpoint
- engage in informed debate
- identify and weigh the conflicting values represented by different points of view
- reflect upon personal values and priorities surrounding an issue
- develop and articulate original viewpoints on an issue
- communicate in written and oral presentations
- collaborate with peers

Teachers who use Choices units say the collaboration and interaction that take place are highly motivating for students. Opportunities abound for students to contribute their individual talents to the group presentations in the form of political cartoons, slogans, posters, or characterizations. These cooperative learning lessons invite students to take pride in their own contributions and the group product, enhancing students' self-esteem and confidence as learners. Choices units offer students with diverse abilities and learning styles the opportunity to contribute, collaborate, and achieve.

Note to Teachers

The end of the Cold War has nudged Russia closer to the West. Russian officials regularly sit down with their Western counterparts at international conferences, while Russian business executives are frequent visitors to New York, London, Los Angeles, and Berlin. Russian society has never been more open to the outside world.

At the same time, many of the most important developments in Russia remain cloaked by Kremlin intrigue or obscured by the complexity of Russia's political and cultural past. Billionaire oligarchs vie for influence. Shadowy underworld figures maintain cozy relations with powerful bureaucrats. Russian generals warn of chaos in what was once the formidable Red Army. Communists and nationalists blame their country's problems on U.S.-engineered conspiracies. Few Americans have the time and the background to keep up with the pace of events in Russia. And yet, Russia remains an area of vital concern for the United States.

Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy allows students and teachers to step back from the day-to-day turmoil in Russia to consider the issues that most deeply affect Americans. At the core of the unit are four distinct options for U.S. policy. Each option contains a different perspective on the threats and opportunities presented by conditions in Russia. By exploring a spectrum of alternatives, students gain a deeper understanding of the values and assumptions underlying U.S. foreign policy. The background reading provides students with the knowledge needed to take part in the debate on the U.S. role in Russia's transition. Part I offers a historical overview of U.S. relations with the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. Part II surveys the economic and political changes that Russia has undergone since the Soviet collapse, with special attention given to Russia's evolving foreign policy. Part III concentrates on the leading challenges facing U.S. policymakers with respect to Russia and its neighbors. There is also an optional reading that features an excerpt from a Soviet-era textbook.

Suggested Five-Day Lesson Plan: The Teacher's Resource Book accompanying *Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy* contains a day-by-day lesson plan and student activities. The unit opens with students assessing the values and assumptions that framed U.S. policy at the onset of the Cold War. An optional lesson exposes students to the image of the United States depicted in Soviet propaganda. Next, students are asked to reflect on how people in today's Russia view the changes affecting their lives. The third and fourth days of the lesson plan involve students in a simulation in which they act as advocates of the four options or take on the role of members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. On the fifth day, students develop coherent policy recommendations based on their own values and beliefs. You may also find the "Alternative Three-Day Lesson Plan" useful.

- **Alternative Study Guides:** Each section of background reading is accompanied by two distinct study guides. The standard study guide is designed to help students harvest the information provided in the background readings in preparation for tackling analysis and synthesis within classroom activities. The advanced study guide requires the student to tackle analysis and synthesis prior to class activities.

- **Vocabulary and Concepts:** The background reading in *Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy* addresses subjects that are complex and challenging. To help your students get the most out of the text, you may want to review with them "Key Terms" found in the Teacher's Resource Book (TRB) on page TRB-27 before they begin their assignment. A " Russia's Uncertain Transition Toolbox" is also included on page TRB-28. This provides additional information on key concepts of particular importance.

The lesson plans offered are provided as a guide. They are designed for traditional class periods of approximately 50 minutes. Those on block schedules will need to make adaptations. Many teachers choose to devote additional time to certain activities. We hope that these suggestions help you in tailoring the unit to fit the needs of your classroom.

Integrating This Unit into Your Curriculum

Units produced by the Choices for the 21st Century Education Project are designed to be integrated into a variety of social studies courses. Below are a few ideas about where *Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy* might fit into your curriculum.

Nuclear Proliferation: The disintegration of the Soviet Union has raised serious new questions about nuclear proliferation. The breakdown of the Soviet system has led to a weakening of the strict controls governing the Soviet nuclear program. Tons of nuclear material, much of it based in poorly guarded non-military facilities, have become vulnerable to nuclear smugglers. The dangers associated with the Soviet collapse come at a time when several Third World counties — particularly North Korea, Iran, and Iraq — are actively seeking to develop their own nuclear arsenals.

China Policy: As progress toward reform in Russia lurches and sputters, Americans are debating what influence, if any, our country can have on Russia's future course. The same questions have been asked with respect to China, both in recent years and during the late 1940s. Like Russia, China is a huge country that has undergone tremendous change since the 1980s. With China's growing economic power, Chinese foreign policy has become more important than ever for the United States. But while China's impact on the international arena has steadily expanded, U.S. leverage over China has remained limited. Should the United States be doing more to ensure friendly relations with China? Should our country have taken stronger action in the late 1940s to prevent the victory of communism in China? The study of U.S. policy toward Russia holds many lessons for students that may apply to our country's relationship with Beijing.

Reflections on the Cold War: As the United States gropes to develop a new relationship with its former Cold War enemy, many foreign policy specialists are drawing lessons from the post-World War II era. The strategy to contain the Soviet Union was formulated in a period of confusion and indecision. Part of the impetus came from the intellectual force of George Kennan and a few of his colleagues in the foreign policy establishment. International events — particularly the fall of Czechoslovakia's democratic government and the Berlin blockade — were also a decisive factor. With the Clinton administration struggling to give shape to current U.S. foreign policy, the time is ripe to reflect on the origins of our country's Cold War strategy and the institutions, such as NATO, that defined the U.S. role in the world for four decades.

Foreign Aid: Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and its neighbors have absorbed a substantial share of the U.S. foreign aid budget. At the same time, U.S. foreign aid spending has shrunk in much of the developing world. The shift in priorities that has occurred in recent years gives Americans an opportunity to reassess our country's overall approach to foreign aid. Evaluating the results of the Marshall Plan is a good place to start. Teachers might also consider examining the record of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In addition, a unit on foreign aid could also explore the expectations and concerns of recipient countries.

Examining the Principles of U.S. Cold War Policy

Objectives:

Students will:

- Identify the assumptions and beliefs that formed the basis of George Kennan's views toward the Soviet Union.
- Analyze Kennan's thesis in the context of U.S. relations with Russia and the Soviet Union before World War II.
- Evaluate how Kennan's recommendations influenced U.S. policy during the course of the Cold War.

Required Reading:

Before beginning the unit, students should have read Part I of the background reading in the student text (pages 1-11) and completed "Study Guide — Part I" in the Teacher's Resource Book (TRB 4-5) or "Advanced Study Guide — Part I" (TRB-6).

Handouts:

- "Sources of Soviet Conduct" (TRB-7).

In the Classroom:

1. Getting Started — Distribute "Sources of Soviet Conduct" and call on students to quickly read it. Note that, in Kennan's view, communist ideology — not the Russian national character — was the driving force behind the Soviet Union's hostility toward the West.

2. Analyzing Kennan's Thesis — Direct student attention to the first underlined passage. Why did Kennan believe that "the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime"? What factors had undermined the friendly relations between the United States and Russia in the 19th century and the U.S.-Soviet wartime alliance?

Note that in the second underlined passage, Kennan refers to "unceasing constant pressure" against the West as a cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy. Ask students to identify historical examples from the background reading that validate Kennan's thesis. In what ways did Soviet foreign policy change from the publication of Kennan's article to Gorbachev's "new thinking"? Which elements of Soviet foreign policy were driven by communist ideology? Which were motivated by traditional Russian national interests?

Explain that the third underlined passage encapsulates the U.S. policy of containment carried out during the Cold War. Ask students to assess the success of U.S. Cold War policy. To what degree did the containment strategy contribute to the end of the Cold War? What were the alternatives? As students read Part II of the background reading, they should be thinking about how the Russian role in the world has changed as a result of the Soviet collapse.

Homework:

Students should read Part II of the background reading in the student text (pages 12-21) and complete "Study Guide — Part II" (TRB 10-11) or "Advanced Study Guide — Part II" (TRB-12).

Name: _____

Study Guide — Part I
Two Centuries of U.S.-Russian Relations

1. In terms of geography, the United States and Russia share much in common. Explain.

2. Explain two important geographical differences between the United States and Russia.

   a.

   b.

3. Who was Lenin? Why was the United States suspicious of him?

4. Lenin's _____, Josef Stalin, turned the attention of the Soviet Union away from pursuing worldwide _____ and toward _____ the backward Soviet economy.

5. How many people died during Stalin's reign of terror?

6. Which nations emerged as the leading powers at the end of World War II. Explain your answer.

7. What is the origin and meaning of the "Iron Curtain?"

8. In February 1946, U.S. diplomat _____ sent an 8,000 word cable to the State Department. In the cable, the diplomat argued that the Soviet system was based on _____ hostility toward _____ and that the _____ should seek to _____ the expansion of Soviet _____.

9. Describe two important policy components of the Truman Doctrine.

a.

b.

10. What was President Eisenhower's doctrine of "massive retaliation?"

11. What did President Nixon hope the policy of *detente* would accomplish?

12. List three events that contributed to the collapse of detente.

a.

b.

c.

12. List at least three ways that Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to change the Soviet Union.

13. When did the Soviet Union cease to exist?

Name:

Advanced Study Guide — Part I
Two Centuries of U.S.-Russian Relations

1. Which international interests were shared in common by the United States and Russia in the 19th century?

2. Why was the communist system created by Lenin and Stalin seen as a rejection of Western capitalism?

3. What assumptions and beliefs about the Soviet Union led U.S. leaders to launch the Marshall Plan and establish NATO?

4. How did international events in the late 1940s and early 1950s contribute to a deepening of Cold War hostility?

5. What were the main reasons Nixon initiated the policy of detente toward the Soviet Union?

6. How did Gorbachev's reform policies contribute to the collapse of the Soviet Union?

The Sources of Soviet Conduct
by "X"

Below are excerpts from an article authored by U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan. The article appeared in Foreign Affairs *in July 1947 and came to serve as the cornerstone for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War. (The full text of Kennan's article can be found on pages 39-47 of the Supplementary Documents section in the student text.)*

...there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet Government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical manoeuvre permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of *caveat emptor*. Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose...

...we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility, and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of a superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.

These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia's adversaries — policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.

American Society from the Soviet Perspective

Objectives:

Students will:

- Assess the image of American society conveyed by Soviet textbooks.
- Analyze the impact of Soviet propaganda on the attitudes of Russians today.
- Consider the sources that contributed to American impressions of the Soviet Union.

Required Reading:

Students should have read "Optional Reading: American Society from the Soviet Perspective" in the student text (pages 37-38).

In the Classroom:

1. Reviewing the Content — Call on students to read "Optional Reading: American Society from the Soviet Perspective." Emphasize that they should pay close attention to how the setting and characters of the story convey the author's message.

2. Understanding Propaganda — Invite students to share their impressions of The Red Shoes. What is the overall image of American society depicted in the story? How is the role of race and class in the United States presented? What is the significance of the "customer in blue work overalls"? Ask students to answer the questions accompanying the story from the perspective of a Soviet student.

3. American Literature in the Soviet Curriculum — Note that American literature occupied an important place in the Soviet curriculum. By the time they graduated from high school, most Soviet students were familiar with selected works of Ernest Hemmingway, William Faulkner, James Baldwin, Mark Twain, Edgar Allan Poe, Jack London, and other well-known authors. Why would Soviet education officials have given American literature such prominence? In what respects did the work of leading American writers serve Soviet propaganda interests? Ask students to compare the place of Soviet or Russian writers in the American curriculum.

4. Comparing Stereotypes — Ask students what impression they hold of the Soviet Union or Russia. What are the sources that have contributed to those impressions? How have their social studies and literature textbooks shaped their attitudes? Note that in Russia today reruns of American television programs (especially prime-time soap operas) and action-adventure movies are popular. Ask students to assess how these recent images of America might influence Russian attitudes toward American society.

Extra Challenge:

Instruct students to write a short story designed to convey a negative impression of Soviet society. Suggest that they use the setting of The Red Shoes. To help students formulate a portrait of Soviet life that will resonate in American classrooms, call on students to identify negative stereotypes of the Soviet Union.

Assessing the Reform Process in Russia

Objectives:

Students will:

- Consider the consequences of Russia's transition from a Russian perspective.
- Analyze the impact of change in Russia on the shape of the country's political spectrum.
- Articulate Russian viewpoints in a collaborative role-play setting.

Required Reading:

Students should have read Part II of the background reading in the student text (pages 12-21) and completed "Study Guide — Part II" (TRB 10-11) or "Advanced Study Guide — Part II" (TRB-12)

Handouts:

- "Exploring Russian Attitudes" (TRB-13).

In the Classroom:

1. Russian Groups — Form five groups of two to four students. (In order to save time in the classroom, form student groups before beginning Day Two.) Distribute "Exploring Russian Attitudes" and assign each of the groups a role from the handout. Instruct the Russian groups to read about their assigned roles. They should also review Part II of the background reading to identify issues that are relevant to their assigned characters.

2. American Journalists — The remainder of the class will represent American journalists. Inform members of this group that they are touring Russia to gather information for articles on Russia's transition. They should develop questions that would be appropriate for ordinary Russians. Emphasize that the questions should be general in nature, so that each group will be able to respond. For example, suggest that the journalists ask each group to evaluate the dismantling of the Soviet economic system. How have the changes affected the lives of the individuals represented?

3. Managing the Role Play — After students have completed their preparations, call on the journalists to direct their questions to the Russian groups. Remind the Russian groups that their responses should reflect the perspectives of their assigned roles.

4. Guiding Discussion — At the conclusion of the role play, ask students to compare the positions of the Russian groups. What factors account for the different viewpoints? Which values stood out most prominently? How do students assess the prospects for continued reform in Russia?

Homework:

Students should read Part III of the background reading in the student text (pages 22-27) and complete "Study Guide — Part III" (TRB 15-16) or "Advanced Study Guide — Part III" (TRB-17).

Name:

Study Guide — Part II
Keeping Up with a Changing Russia

1. List three ways that Russia has changed since the end of the Soviet Union.

   a.

   b.

   c.

2. Describe the events that led to Vladimir Putin becoming the Russian President.

3. Identify and describe the ideology of the three main political groups in Russia today.

   a.

   b.

   c.

4. For the oligarchs, politics are less about _____ than about control of Russia's key _____, _____, and _____ institutions.

5. List three steps that President Putin has taken to control the power of regional leaders.

   a.

   b.

   c.

6. Explain how the war in Chechnya affected Putin's popularity in Russia.

7. Russia's economic reforms during the first-half of the 1990s were successful. True of false. Explain your answer.

8. List the ways that the old Soviet system has an effect on the current economy in the following areas.

   a. technological innovation:

   b. the environment:

   c. agriculture:

9. In human terms, the losers in Russia's transformation far outnumber the winners. One-third of the country's population gets by on less than _____ per month. Mortality rates for working age Russians are higher than they were_____. Life expectancy for males is _____. Experts believe that Russia's population could shrink by_____ to _____ million by 2025.

10. List two ways that the Russian military has been affected by its reduced budget since the end of the Soviet Union.

    a.

    b.

Name:

Advanced Study Guide — Part II
Keeping Up with a Changing Russia

1. How do the political views of the communists and nationalists in Russia differ from those of the Yeltsin government?

2. What accounts for the setbacks of the Russian army in Chechnya?

3. Why did the "shock therapy" program of economic reform encounter strong resistance?

4. How has Russia's economy changed since the Soviet collapse? How have these changes affected Russia's position in the international arena?

5. Why do you think older Russians are especially critical of the economic changes they have seen since the Soviet collapse?

6. Why has Russia lost influence among its neighbors since the Soviet collapse?

Exploring Russian Attitudes

Instructions: Your group has been called upon to express the concerns of ordinary Russians. Your teacher will assign you one of the roles below. You will be questioned by several American journalists about the changes that have taken place in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Your responses should reflect the perspective of your assigned role. To gain a firm understanding of the role you are representing, review Part II of the background reading and share your ideas with the other members in your group.

1. Computer Software Designer

You graduated from one of the Soviet Union's leading institutes in computer science in 1990. Although you have come to recognize that your training was not equal to that of your colleagues in the West, you have benefited in recent years from the growing exchange of information between Russia and the outside world. Along with several other recent graduates, you have formed a successful software development company. By charging fees three times below the standards of the West, you have attracted many clients from the United States and Western Europe.

2. Unemployed Steel Worker

You have worked in a huge steel factory for nearly thirty years. During the Soviet era, your enterprise supplied steel for defense factories, but orders began to go down after 1990. A few years ago, your enterprise shifted from state control to private ownership. Although you and your co-workers were given shares in the company, the factory managers claimed that they could no longer afford to keep everyone employed. Many of your friends were laid off. You remain on the factory payroll, but your monthly salary is worth only about $35 a month. Moreover, your shares in the company are practically worthless. Your factory's managers contend that they need government help to invest in new technology to revive Russia's steel industry.

3. Naval Officer

You serve on a Russian ship based in the Black Sea. After the Soviet Union fell apart, Ukrainian officials called on you to pledge your loyalty to Ukraine. You refused, but a few of your fellow officers signed the pledge. There have even been a few scuffles between Russian and Ukrainian sailors in the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol. While the Soviet Union was intact, there was hardly any thought as to who was Russian and who was Ukrainian. Meanwhile, the maintenance of your ship has suffered because of budget cuts. Military salaries are so low that many of your fellow officers have left the navy.

4. Small Business Owner

You have started a business from scratch selling snack foods to the public. After the fall of the Soviet Union, you began importing dried fruit and pistachios from Iran. You also began buying sunflower and pumpkin seeds from southern Russia. Your business now has eight employees who sell your products from small sidewalk booths. A good share of your profits goes to the local mafia, but so far they have protected you from thieves. You also have to regularly bribe government officials to get the licenses you need to operate. Although you worked as an engineer for more than a decade, you're earning much more money now as a businessman.

5. Refugee from Chechnya

You are among the tens of thousands of Russians who have fled the war in Chechnya. You had a comfortable life in Grozny, the Chechen capital, during the Soviet era. You and your family moved there in the 1960s when you were still a teenager. After college, you worked as a petrochemical engineer at a local oil refinery. Although you are ethnically Russian, many of your close friends are Chechen. When the war began again in 1999, you and your family suffered along with your Chechen neighbors. You fled during a lull in the Russian army's attack. Now you are unemployed and living with relatives in an overcrowded apartment in southern Russia. If Chechnya remains part of Russia and conditions return to normal, you would like to go back to your old home.

Role Playing the Four Options: Organization and Preparation

Objectives:

Students will:

- Analyze the issues that frame the debate on U.S. policy toward Russia.
- Identify the core underlying values of the options.
- Integrate the arguments and beliefs of the options and the background reading into a persuasive, coherent presentation.
- Work cooperatively within groups to organize effective presentations.

Required Reading:

Students should have read Part III of the background reading in the student text (pages 22-27) and completed "Study Guide — Part III" (TRB 15-16) or "Advanced Study Guide — Part III" (TRB-17) .

Handouts:

- "Presenting Your Option" (TRB-18) for option groups.
- "Expressing Key Values" (TRB-19) for option groups.
- "Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate" (TRB-20) for committee members.

Note: Students will also be using the options in the student text (pages 28-36).

In the Classroom:

1. Planning for Group Work — In order to save time in the classroom, form student groups before beginning Day Three. During the class period of Day Three, students will be preparing for the Day Four simulation. Remind them to incorporate the background reading into the development of their presentations and questions.

2a. Option Groups — Form four groups of four students. Assign an option to each group. Distribute "Presenting Your Option" and "Expressing Key Values" to the four option groups. Inform students that each option group will be called upon in Day Four to present the case for its assigned option to members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate. Explain that option groups should follow the instructions in "Presenting Your Option." Note that the option groups should begin by assigning each member a role.

2b. Committee Members — The remainder of the class will serve as members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate. Distribute "Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate" to each committee member. While the option groups are preparing their presentations, members of the Committee on Foreign Relations should read the four options and develop cross-examination questions for Day Four. (See "Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate.") Remind committee members that they are expected to turn in their questions at the end of the simulation.

Suggestions:

In smaller classes, other teachers or administrators may be invited to serve as members of the committee. In larger classes, additional roles — such as those of newspaper reporter or lobbyist — may be assigned to students.

Extra Challenge:

Ask the option groups to design a poster or political cartoon illustrating the best case for their options.

Homework:

Students should complete preparations for the simulation.

Study Guide — Part III
Challenges Facing the United States

1. When the Soviet Union fell apart, Russia and its neighbors had about _____ nuclear warheads.

2. Nuclear arms fall into two categories. Identify the categories and explain their intended use.

   a.

   b.

3. How has Russia reacted to a proposed U.S. missile defense system?

4. U.S. security officials chief concern is no longer Russia's strategic nuclear weapons. What are they concerned about? Explain.

5. List three ways that the United States has helped Russia safeguard it nuclear weapons.

   a.

   b.

   c.

6. List two reasons why Russia attaches great importance to its nuclear weapons?

   a.

   b.

6. Fill in the chart below that highlights U.S.-Russian policy positions. Explain the reasons for Russia's and the United States' positions.

Issue	U.S. Policy Position and its Reasons	Russian Policy Position and its Reasons
NATO Expansion		
Iraq		
Kosovo		

7. The United States budgeted $_____million in total foreign aid for the entire Former Soviet Union in the year 2000. Russia is to receive approximately $_____ of the total.

8. Give three reasons why some critics have objected to IMF loans to Russia.

a.

b.

c.

9. Give two reasons why Russia has not been admitted to the World Trade Organization.

a.

b.

10. The United States has objected to Russian arms sales. How do Russian officials respond to U.S. objections?

Advanced Study Guide — Part III
Challenges Facing the United States

1. Why has the collapse of the Soviet Union created a new set of dangers associated with nuclear weapons?

2. How are the size and strategic role of Russia's nuclear arsenal likely to change over the next decade?

3. Explain how the American and Russian positions differ regarding the role of NATO.

   American position:

   Russian position:

4. In what areas of the "near abroad" have U.S. and Russian interests come into conflict? Explain the causes of the friction.

5. How has foreign aid shaped the direction of Russia's economic reforms since 1992?

6. How have trade issues contributed to friction in U.S.-Russian relations?

Presenting Your Option

Preparing Your Presentation

Your Assignment: Your group has been called upon to appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate. Your assignment is to persuade the committee members that your option should be the basis for U.S. policy toward Russia. You will be judged on how well you present your option.

Organizing Your Group: Each member of your group will take a specific role. Below is a brief explanation of the responsibilities for each role.

1. *Spokesperson:* Your job is to explain the option of your group to the Committee on Foreign Relations in a three-to-five minute presentation. In preparing your presentation, you will receive help from the other members of your group. You should include arguments from their areas of expertise. Keep in mind, though, that you are expected to take the lead in organizing your group. Read your option and review the background reading to build a strong case for your option. The "Expressing Key Values" worksheet will help you organize your thoughts.

2. *Russian Expert:* Your job is to advise the spokesperson of your group as to how current developments in Russia justify the position of your option. Carefully read your option, and then review Part II of the background reading. Make sure that your area of expertise is reflected in the presentation of your group spokesperson. The "Expressing Key Values" worksheet will help you organize your thoughts.

3. *U.S. Foreign Policy Adviser:* Your job is to advise the spokesperson of your group on why your option best addresses the foreign policy challenges facing the United States. Carefully read your option, and then review Part III of the background reading. Make sure that your area of expertise is reflected in the presentation of your group spokesperson. The "Expressing Key Values" worksheet will help you organize your thoughts.

4. *Historian:* Your job is to advise the spokesperson of your group on how the lessons of history justify the position of your option. Carefully read your option, paying close attention to the "Lessons of the Cold War" section, and then review Part I of the background reading. Make sure that your area of expertise is reflected in the presentation of your group spokesperson. The "Expressing Key Values" worksheet will help you organize your thoughts.

Making Your Case

After your preparations are completed, your spokesperson will deliver a three-to-five minute presentation to the Committee on Foreign Relations. The "Expressing Key Values" worksheet and other notes may be used, but the spokesperson should speak clearly and convincingly. During the presentations, you should try to identify the weak points of the other options. After all of the groups have presented their options, members of the Senate committee will ask you cross-examination questions. Any member of your group may respond during the cross-examination period.

Expressing Key Values

The notion of values lies at the core of this unit. Each of the four options in this unit revolves around a distinct set of values. The opening two paragraphs of your option are devoted to making a convincing case for the values that are represented. The term "values," however, is not easy to define. Most often, we think of values in connection with our personal lives. Our attitudes toward our families, friends, and communities are a reflection of our personal values.

Values play a critical role in our civic life as well. In the United States, our country's political system and foreign policy have been shaped by a wide range of values. The high value many Americans place on freedom, democracy, and individual liberty rings loudly throughout U.S. history. For most of our country's existence, the impulse to spread American values beyond our borders was outweighed by the desire to remain independent of foreign entanglements. Since World War II, however, the United States has played a larger role in world affairs than any other nation. At times, American leaders have emphasized the values of human rights and cooperation. On other occasions, the values of stability and security have been stressed.

Some values fit together well. Others are in conflict. Americans are constantly being forced to choose among competing values in our ongoing debate about foreign policy. Your job is to identify and explain the most important values underlying your option. These values should be clearly expressed by every member of your group. This worksheet will help you organize your thoughts.

1. What are the two most important values underlying your option?

   a.

   b.

2. According to the values of your option, what should be the role of the United States in the world?

3. Why should the values of your option be the guiding force for U.S. policy toward Russia?

Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate
Hearing on U.S. Policy toward Russia

Your Role

As a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, you consider issues relating to our country's foreign policy. As you know, the Soviet Union was the focus of U.S. foreign policy for over four decades after World War II. Now that the Soviet Union has collapsed, Americans are debating what role, if any, the United States should play in the transition taking place in Russia. These hearings will introduce you to four distinct approaches to this question.

Your Assignment

While the four option groups are organizing their presentations, you should read the four options and prepare two questions regarding each. Your teacher will collect these questions at the end of Day Four.

Your questions should be challenging and critical. For example, a good question for Option 1 might be:

> *Isn't there a danger that strong U.S. support for economic reform in Russia will lead Russians to blame our country for the suffering associated with change?*

On Day Four, the four option groups will present their positions. After their presentations are completed, your teacher will call on you and your fellow committee members to ask questions. The "Evaluation Form" you receive is designed for you to record your impressions of the option groups. Part I should be filled out in class after the option groups make their presentations. Part II should be completed as homework. After this activity is concluded, you may be called upon to explain your evaluation of the option groups.

Role Playing the Four Options: Debate and Discussion

Objectives:

Students will:

- Articulate the leading values influencing U.S. policy toward Russia.
- Explore, debate, and evaluate multiple perspectives on U.S. foreign policy.
- Sharpen rhetorical skills through debate and discussion.
- Cooperate with classmates in staging a persuasive presentation.

Handouts:

- "Evaluation Form" (TRB-22) for the committee members.

In the Classroom:

1. Setting the Stage — Organize the room so that the four option groups face a row of desks reserved for the Committee on Foreign Relations. Distribute "Evaluation Form" to the committee members. Instruct members of the committee to fill out the first part of their "Evaluation Form" during the course of the period. The second part of the worksheet should be completed as homework.

2. Managing the Simulation — Explain that the simulation will begin with three-to-five minute presentations by the spokespersons for the option groups. Encourage the spokespersons to speak clearly and convincingly.

3. Guiding Discussion — Following the presentations, invite members of the Committee on Foreign Relations to ask cross-examination questions. Make sure that each committee member has an opportunity to ask at least one question. The questions should be evenly distributed among all four option groups. If time permits, encourage members of the option groups to challenge the positions of the other groups. During cross-examination, allow any option group member to respond. (As an alternative approach, permit cross-examination following the presentation of each option.)

Homework:

Students should read each of the four options in the student text (pages 28-36), then moving beyond these options they should fill out "Focusing Your Thoughts" (TRB-24) and complete "Your Option Five" (TRB-25).

Name:

Evaluation Form

Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate

Part I

What was the most persuasive argument presented in favor of this option?	What was the most persuasive argument presented against this option?
Option 1	*Option 1*
Option 2	*Option 2*
Option 3	*Option 3*
Option 4	*Option 4*

Part II

Which group presented its option most effectively? Explain your answer.

Fleshing Out Policy

Objectives:

Students will:

- Articulate coherent recommendations for U.S. policy toward Russia based on personally held values and historical understanding.
- Compare their policy guidelines with the position of the U.S government.
- Analyze the goals and values underlying policy recommendations.

Required Reading:

Students should have read each of the four options in the student text (pages 28-36), and completed "Focusing Your Thoughts" (TRB-24) and "Your Option Five" (TRB-25).

Handouts:

- "Comparing Your Recommendations" (TRB-26).

In the Classroom:

1. Analyzing Beliefs — Call on members of the Senate committee to share their evaluations of the option groups. Which arguments were most convincing? Which beliefs were most appealing? What were the main threats addressed by each of the options?

2. Student Options — Call on students to summarize their answers to "Your Option Five." What were the chief concerns that guided the formulation of their options? What are their views about the future of U.S. relations with Russia? In what direction do they believe Russia is headed over the next decade? How important is this part of the world compared to other issues at home and abroad?

3. Drawing Comparisons — Distribute "Comparing Your Recommendations" and review the handout with the class. What assumptions underlie the Clinton administration's policy toward Russia? Which interests and goals dominate the U.S. agenda? What values stand out most clearly? Do the policy steps reflect the values? Ask students to compare their own recommendations with the position of the Clinton administration. What are the main areas of disagreement? What accounts for the differences? Which statements in the handout enjoy widespread support among the students?

Extra Challenge:

As homework, instruct students to write a letter to a member of Congress or the President on their ideas for U.S. policy toward Russia. In the first part of the letter, students should present the values and assumptions underlying their viewpoint, while in the second part of the letter students should present a coherent set of policy recommendations.

Encourage students to explore the local dimension of the debate on U.S. foreign policy. For example, students could be asked to contact organizations that have a deeply rooted interest in U.S. policy toward Russia. Groups that have sought to promote U.S. trade with Russia and its neighbors, such as oil companies and farm bureaus, have voiced their views on this issue. Ethnic organizations, and friendship societies are also active in the foreign policy arena. In addition, recent years have witnessed an influx of immigrants, scholars, and students from Russia.

Focusing Your Thoughts

Instructions: You have had an opportunity to consider four options on U.S. policy toward Russia. Now it is your turn to look at each of the options from your own perspective. Try each one on for size. Think about how the options address your concerns and hopes. You will find that each has its own risks and trade-offs, advantages and disadvantages. After you complete this worksheet, you will be asked to develop your own option on this issue.

Ranking the Options

Which of the options below do you prefer? Rank the options, with "1" being the best option for the United States to follow.

___ **Option 1: Guide Russia Forward**

___ **Option 2: Keep the Lid On**

___ **Option 3: Declaw the Russian Bear**

___ **Option 4: Mind Our Own Business**

Beliefs

Considering the statements below will help you answer the first three questions of "Your Option Five." Rate each of them according to your personal beliefs:

1 = Strongly Support
2 = Support
3 = Oppose
4 = Strongly Oppose
5 = Undecided

___ The greatest threats facing the United States are all at home: poverty, mediocre schools, crime, and an inadequate health care system.

___ Our most trustworthy allies are those countries that share our democratic principles and free-market economic system.

___ Geography and culture largely determine which countries are enemies of the United States.

___ Trying to make deep changes in other societies is naive and dangerous.

___ The main foreign policy interests of the United States lie in preserving stability and order around the world.

___ We will always have to compete with other nations for power.

___ Every country, even one emerging from communism, is capable of transforming itself into a free-market democracy.

___ The end of the Cold War has made the world a more dangerous place.

Creating Your Own Option

Your next assignment is to create an option that reflects your own beliefs and opinions. You may borrow heavily from one option, or you may combine ideas from two or three options. Or you may take a new approach altogether. There are, of course, no perfect solutions. And there is no right or wrong answer. Rather, you should strive to craft an option that is logical and persuasive. Be careful of contradictions. For example, you should not invite Russia's neighbors to join NATO, while leaving Russia out, if you want to promote cooperation between the United States and Russia.

Name: Day 5

Your Option Five

Instructions: In this exercise, you will offer your own recommendations for U.S. policy toward Russia. Your responses to "Focusing Your Thoughts" should help you identify the guiding values of your proposal.

1. How are U.S. interests affected by the transition of Russia and its neighbors?

2. What should be the most important goals guiding U.S. policy toward Russia?

3. What policy steps should the United States take to achieve the goals you have identified?

4. What are the two strongest arguments opposing your option?

   a.

   b.

5. What are the two strongest arguments supporting your option?

   a.

   b.

Comparing Your Recommendations

Below are excerpts from a speech delivered by Thomas Pickering, under secretary of state, on March 28, 2000, in Washington, DC. The speech, entitled "Russia: Sleeping Superpower?" analyzes the current situation in Russia and outlines goals for U.S. policy towards Russia. Now that you have completed "Your Option Five," compare your own recommendations for U.S. policy toward Russia to the position outlined in Pickering's speech.

U.S. policy goals

No shadows hide the problems Russia must face, but it is equally true that no every-day adversity can diminish the extraordinary potential of that land and people. We here today share an admiration and a hope for Russia, even as we know clearly its problems and remain in awe of its potential.The United States welcomes its new relationship with Russia and strongly believes that a healthy relationship between our two countries is the best course. Each thereby is made more secure, and our citizens and business people are given more opportunity. The relationship will be stronger if Russia completes its democratic and economic transition. We can play a constructive role to help that happen. It is clearly in our interest to do so and for our government and people and country to be part of that process

U.S. interest in Russian reform

A Russia that boasts a healthy economy, strong institutions, and a political system that works is a country that understands that future progress depends not on dominating others but on forging economic and political partnerships in the global community. To paraphrase Prime Minister Thatcher, that would be a Russia we can do business with. And there is no downside. The zero-sum world of the Cold War is gone; we have nothing to lose by a Russia that is economically and politically strong and confident about its own security, and we have everything to gain by a Russia that can be a full partner in the world community.

Assessing Russia's transition

Russia is still very much a work in progress. No one is under the illusion that Russia's path to democracy and a full market economy is getting any easier. And we realize that Russian transformation is not a matter of months or years but something that probably will take decades and generations. I think it is worthwhile to turn for a moment to Russia's economy, where the transition from a state run to a market driven system has been slow and has disappointed many — not the least of which is Russia's own population. It is clear now that this process will take longer than any of us thought.

Russia's international role

Our policy of engagement also means that we engage in areas where we have strong disagreements. This is what grabs the headlines and for many becomes the entirety of the relationship. Indeed, the relationship has had its share of very heavy weather—between Kosovo and Chechnya and our deep concerns about Russian support for missile and nuclear projects in Iran. But I also want to point out that during the Kosovo campaign, when media pundits were predicting the absolute end of the relationship, we were quietly continuing our work on other issues. During this period, we concluded agreements on the framework for the historic CFE Adaptation Treaty, negotiated a Civil Air Agreement, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, and the list goes on. As for Kosovo, despite virulent debate, the Russians proved to be instrumental in the diplomatic solution that brought an end to the military action. Cooperation on the ground between Russian and other KFOR troops remains excellent. The military-to-military relationship and the NATO-Russia relationship are both getting back on track now, too, and the U.S., Russia, and others are meeting today in Europe in the Contact Group to chart a future course together in Kosovo.

Long-term U.S. strategy

Since the Cold War ended, the U.S. has pursued three overriding goals in its relationship with Russia: The first is to increase the safety of the American people by working to reduce Cold War arsenals, stop proliferation, and create a stable and undivided Europe. The second is to work with Russia internationally, and the third is to support Russia's effort to transform its political, economic, and social institutions at home.

Key Terms

Part I: Two Centuries of Russian-U.S. Relations

superpower
communist
containment
Cold War
nuclear arsenal
democracy
free-market economics
authoritarian state
empire
international system
industrialization
capitalism
economy
ideology
balance of power
League of Nations
alliance
social upheaval
depression
iron curtain
containment
aid
NATO
blockade
sphere of influence
arms race
detente
Soviet bloc
perestroika
glasnost
arms control
autonomy
coup

Part II: Keeping Up with a Changing Russia

one-party system
economic reform
oligarchs
materialism
autocratic
guerrilla
shock therapy
budget deficit
fiscal
world marketplace
imports
raw materials
privatization
inflation
mortality rates
birth rates
entrepreneurs
near abroad
economic development
radical Islamic fundamentalism

Part III: Challenges Facing the United States

nuclear warheads
weapons stockpiles
black market
budget constraints
conventional army
oil reserves
UN Security Council
international sanctions
peacekeeping
trade barriers
exports

Russia's Uncertain Transition
Issues Toolbox

Socialism: Socialism is a political and economic system in which resources, property, and income are distributed subject to political control rather than individual or market forces.

Marxism-Leninism: A form of socialism that for much of the twentieth century was in competition with capitalism. In their book, the *Communist Manifesto*, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels outlined a form of scientific socialism in which the workers of the world would unite against capitalist exploitation. Lenin adapted and added to Marx's ideas. He believed that workers needed leadership in the form of the Communist Party and state to implement socialism.

The state: The institutions and organizations of government. Different political systems have assigned different roles to the state. In the Soviet Union, Lenin believed that the power of the state should be absolute and that it should have control over all aspects of its citizens' lives in order to achieve communism.

Cold War: The Cold War was the dominant foreign policy problem for the United States and Russia between the late 1940s and the late 1980s. Following the defeat of Hitler in 1945, Soviet-U.S. relations began to deteriorate. The United States adopted a policy of containing the spread of Soviet communism around the world, which led to, among other things, U.S. involvement in Vietnam. During this period both Russia and the United States devoted vast resources to their military, but never engaged in direct military action against each other. Because both the Soviet Union and the United States had nuclear weapons and were in competition around the world, nearly every foreign policy decision was intricately examined for its potential impact on U.S.-Soviet relations. The end of the Cold War forced policy makers to struggle to define a new guiding purpose for their foreign policy.

NATO: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in 1949 to ensure the defense of member nations against a perceived threat from the Soviet Union and its satellite countries. The alliance included the United States and Canada as well as countries in Europe. During the Cold War, NATO forces faced the forces of the Warsaw Pact (the Soviet Union and its allies) across the border of West and East Germany. With the end of the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact dissolved. NATO no longer had an adversary. The inclusion of former Warsaw Pact members in NATO has angered many in Russia, who see NATO as an organization whose sole purpose is to oppose Russian interests. Nonetheless, NATO and Russia have begun to meet regularly to discuss cooperation and military issues of mutual concern.

Making Choices Work in Your Classroom

Like the art of cooking, cooperative group learning is a skill that is rarely perfected on the first attempt, either by teachers or students. Yet with careful preparation, guidance, and practice significant gains can be made quickly. No single recipe guarantees success with cooperative learning or the Choices approach in every classroom. That would be impossible, since each classroom differs in its organization and size, and its unique collection of personalities and needs. However, this section of the Teacher's Resource Book offers a variety of ingredients for teachers to use as they adapt Choices curricula to their classrooms. The suggested ingredients that follow have been drawn from educational research on student-centered instruction and, more important, from the experiences of teachers who have used Choices curricula successfully in their classrooms over the past six years. Educators who have questions about using Choices curricula in their classrooms are encouraged to contact the Choices Education Project in writing, or by calling (401)863-3155. The Choices staff includes experienced classroom teachers who will be pleased to speak with you.

Designing Cooperative Learning Groups

Group Size: The key to successful cooperative group work is having a group assignment that is complex enough to require the participation of all group members. Planning the size and composition of working groups in advance is crucial to the successful use of Choices curricula. Research indicates that the ideal size for a cooperative learning group is four or five students. This is certainly the ideal size for group assignments in Choices units. When using Choices units in larger classes, the size of option groups may be expanded to six or seven students. However, it is important to keep in mind that whenever the number of students in a group is increased, the number of roles and expected outcomes must also be expanded.

Group Composition: A strength of cooperative learning is that it creates opportunities for students to work together in new combinations on challenging tasks. Cooperative learning not only requires the academic skills of reading, writing, and critical thinking, but the interpersonal skills of communication, negotiation, and problem-solving. In most cases, this style of instruction and learning is most effective when students are assigned to groups by the teacher rather than being allowed to work with their friends. While random group selection can be effective, in most classes successful group composition requires that the teacher consider the personalities, strengths, and needs of the students.

Groups comprised of students with diverse strengths, talents, and needs are ideal. For example, artistic students might be assigned to different groups to share their talents and perspectives, while less verbal students could be placed in groups with more outgoing students to help draw them into the lesson. Whenever possible, teachers should try to prevent one student from dominating a group. Explaining the instructions, roles, and ground rules for cooperative learning (see below) helps prevent this. Teachers may choose to group aggressive students with each other, leaving room in other groups for less assertive students to emerge as leaders. Finally, even though the negotiation of roles among the students in a group can be a valuable part of the cooperative learning experience, teachers might choose to assign certain roles, such as group spokesperson, in order to encourage leadership from more reticent students and to keep more aggressive students from dominating.

Students may initially complain about being assigned to groups that do not include their closest friends. We have found that, at the conclusion of the assignment, they will usually express satisfaction with their assigned partners, recognize that they got more accomplished, and sometimes even acknowledge the start of new friendships. The additional time involved in planning group size and composition will pay off when students are actively engaged, debating, and thinking critically.

Preparing Students for Cooperative Learning

Provide Clear Written Instructions: As with any assignment, students benefit from instructions and guidelines that clearly outline expectations and how they will be accomplished. These should be given to students in writing and reviewed with the class. Afterwards, as questions arise within groups, students should refer to the written instructions and attempt to answer each other's questions before asking for the teacher's assistance.

Establish Ground Rules: Especially when cooperative learning is a new experience, students benefit from the establishment of ground rules that are explained before groups are formed. Ground rules must be kept simple, and should be designed to keep students involved and on task. Posting these rules in a prominent place in the classroom can be very effective. An example of simple but effective ground rules for the cooperative group assignments could be:

Everybody has a role (or a job)
Everybody participates
Nobody dominates
Nobody interrupts

These rules can be enforced by appointing one student to serve as the group manager. The teacher can make it clear that one of the group manager's responsibilities is to enforce the ground rules as the group explores its assigned option and prepares its presentation. The group manager might also be required to make sure that members of the group stay on task and attempt to solve problems before asking for the teacher's assistance. Ground rules that are clear and used consistently can, over time, become an integral component of the classroom, facilitating learning and keeping students on task.

Managing the Choices Simulation

Recognize Time Limitations: At the heart of the Choices approach is the role-play simulation in which students advocate different options, question each other, and debate. Just as thoughtful preparation is necessary to set the stage for cooperative group learning, careful planning for the presentations and debate can increase the effectiveness of the simulation. Time is the essential ingredient to keep in mind. A minimum of 45 to 50 minutes is necessary for the presentations and debate. Hence, if only one class period is available, student groups must be ready as soon as class begins. Teachers who have been able to schedule a double period or extend the length of class to one hour report that the extra time is beneficial. When necessary, the role-play simulation can be run over two days, but this disrupts the momentum of the debate. The best strategy for managing the role-play is to establish and enforce strict time limits, such as five minutes for each option presentation, ten minutes for questions and challenges, and the final five minutes of class for wrapping up the debate. It is crucial to make students aware of strict time limits as they prepare their presentations.

Highlight the Importance of Values: During the debate and debriefing, it is important to highlight the role of values in the options. Students should be instructed to identify the core values and priorities underlying the different options.

Moving Beyond the Options

As a culminating activity of a Choices unit, students are expected to articulate their own views of the issue under consideration. An effective way to move beyond the options debate to creating individual options is to have students consider which values in the options framework they hold most dear. Typically, students will hold several of these values simultaneously and will need to prioritize them to reach a considered judgment about the issue at hand. These values should be reflected in their own options and should shape the goals and policies they advocate.

Adjusting for Large and Small Classes

Choices units are designed for an average class of twenty-five students. In larger classes, additional roles, such as those of newspaper reporter or member of a special interest group, can be assigned to increase student participation in the simulation. With larger option groups, additional tasks might be to create a poster, political cartoon, or public service announcement that represents the viewpoint of an option. In smaller classes, the teacher can serve as the moderator of the debate, and administrators, parents, or faculty can be invited to play the roles of congressional leaders. Another alternative is to combine two small classes.

Assessing Student Achievement

Grading Group Assignments: Research suggests that it is counterproductive to give students individual grades on cooperative group assignments. A significant part of the assignment given to the group is to cooperate in achieving a common goal, as opposed to looking out for individual interests. Telling students in advance that the group will receive one grade often motivates group members to hold each other accountable. This can foster group cohesion and lead to better group results. It may be useful to note that in addition to the cooperative group assignments, students complete individual assignments as well in every Choices unit. The "Assessment Guide for Oral Presentations" on the following page is designed to help teachers evaluate group presentations.

Requiring Self-Evaluation: Having students complete self-evaluations is an extremely effective way to make them think about their own learning. Self-evaluations can take many forms and are useful in a variety of circumstances. They are particularly helpful in getting students to think constructively about group collaboration. In developing a self-evaluation tool for students, teachers need to pose clear and direct questions to students. Two key benefits of student self-evaluation are that it involves students in the assessment process, and that it provides teachers with valuable insights into the contributions of individual students and the dynamics of different groups. These insights can help teachers to organize groups for future cooperative assignments.

Evaluating Student Options: The most important outcomes of a Choices unit are the original options developed and articulated by each student. These will differ significantly from one another, as students identify different values and priorities that shape their viewpoints. These options cannot be graded as right or wrong, but should be evaluated on clarity of expression, logic, and thoroughness. Did the student provide reasons for his/her viewpoint along with supporting evidence? Were the values clear and consistent throughout the option? Did the student identify the risks involved? Did the student present his/her option in a convincing manner?

Testing: In a formal evaluation of the Choices approach, it was demonstrated that students using Choices learned the factual information presented as well as or better than students who were taught in a more traditional lecture-discussion format. However, the larger benefits of the Choices approach were evident when students using Choices demonstrated significantly higher ability to think critically, analyze multiple perspectives, and articulate original viewpoints, compared to students who did not use this approach. Teachers should hold students accountable for learning historical information, concepts, and current events presented in Choices units. However, a simple multiple-choice examination will not allow students to demonstrate the critical thinking and communication skills developed through the Choices unit. If teachers choose to test students, they may wish to explore new models of test design that require students to do more than recognize correct answers. Tests should not replace the development of student options.

For Further Reading: Cohen, Elizabeth G. *Designing Groupwork: Strategies for the Heterogeneous Classroom* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1986).

Name: _____

Assessment Guide for Oral Presentations

Group assignment: _____

Group members: _____

_____

Group Assessment	*Excellent*	*Good*	*Average*	*Needs Improvement*	*Unsatisfactory*
1. The group made good use of its preparation time	5	4	3	2	1
2. The presentation reflected analysis of the issues under consideration	5	4	3	2	1
3. The presentation was coherent and persuasive	5	4	3	2	1
4. The group incorporated relevant sections of the background reading into its presentation	5	4	3	2	1
5. The group's presenters spoke clearly, maintained eye contact, and made an effort to hold the attention of their audience	5	4	3	2	1
6. The presentation incorporated contributions from all the members of the group	5	4	3	2	1
Individual Assessment					
1. The student cooperated with other group members	5	4	3	2	1
2. The student was well-prepared to meet his or her responsibilities	5	4	3	2	1
3. The student made a significant contribution to the group's presentation	5	4	3	2	1

Alternative Three-Day Lesson Plan

Day 1: See Day Two of the Suggested Five-Day Lesson Plan. (Students should have read Part II of the background reading and completed "Study Guide — Part II" before beginning the unit.)
Homework: Students should read Part III of the background reading and complete "Study Guide — Part III."

Day 2: Assign each student one of the four options, and allow a few minutes for students to familiarize themselves with the mindsets of the options. Call on students to evaluate the benefits and trade-offs of their assigned options. How do the options differ in their interpretation of history? How do they view the prospects for future relations between the United States and Russia? Ask students to respond to a current issue, such as the expansion of NATO into Central Europe, through the perspective of their assigned options. Moving beyond the options, ask students to imagine they are participating in a meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Which beliefs and values should guide the direction of U.S. policy toward Russia? Which threats associated with the FSU should rank at the top of the U.S. policy agenda?
Homework: Students should complete "Focusing Your Thoughts" and "Your Option Five."

Day 3: See Day Five of the Suggested Five-Day Lesson Plan.

Notes

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Russia's Uncertain Transition: Challenges for U.S. Policy

PUBLIC POLICY DEBATE IN THE CLASSROOM

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Thomas J. Biersteker
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Part I: Two Centuries of Russian-U.S. Relations

On Christmas Day, 1991, U.S. President George Bush addressed the nation as the once powerful Soviet Union tottered on the brink of collapse. Bush asserted that the disintegration of the communist superpower represented a victory for democracy, freedom, and American values. The future, according to the president, held out the promise of greater peace and prosperity worldwide, and he expressed confidence that the United States could help promote reform in the former Soviet Union.

The optimism that marked Bush's speech has since been dampened by the course of international events. A new era has begun, yet many of the dangers of the past remain. Just as Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union have entered a period of uncertainty, Americans have been forced to reassess our country's overall role in the world.

For four decades, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in the Cold War. The two superpowers built up arsenals of nuclear weapons capable of destroying civilization many times over and extended their influence to every corner of the globe. The U.S.-Soviet rivalry was the driving force behind our country's vast network of alliances and formidable military. Two generations of American policymakers saw the containment of Soviet communism as their principal mission.

How has U.S. foreign policy changed since the end of the Cold War?

With the end of the Cold War, the United States lost its foreign policy compass. The Soviet collapse led many Americans to turn away from issues overseas and to concentrate on our needs here at home. At the same time, other countries and problem began to occupy the attention of American policymakers.

Nonetheless, the former Soviet Union still casts an enormous shadow on the world stage. Russia — by far the largest of the fifteen former Soviet states — ranks as a giant among nations. The country covers one-seventh of the earth's land and contains huge reserves of oil, gas, minerals, and other natural resources. Even with its economy in shambles, Russia possesses a nuclear arsenal comparable to that of the United States and an army second in strength only to our own. No other country has the power to directly threaten the security of the United States.

Washington and Moscow are no longer bitter enemies, but neither are they allies. In the wake of the Soviet Union's disintegration at the end of 1991, both U.S. and Russian officials were quick to embrace one another as partners. Substantial progress was achieved in reducing nuclear arms and curbing international conflict. The initial enthusiasm, however, has been dimmed by the experiences of the post-Soviet era. The hope that Russia would swiftly adopt the American brand of democracy and free-market economics has been replaced by an understanding that Russia's future is far from certain. New voices have arisen in Russian politics to remind us that the former Cold War enemies remain divided on many important issues.

In this unit, you will join in the debate on U.S. policy toward Russia and its neighbors in the former Soviet Union (FSU). You will grapple with the same questions that face U.S. policymakers: Should we view Russia as a potential ally, a tough rival, a wounded enemy, or something else? How do changes in the FSU affect the United States? What actions, if any, should we take to influence developments in Russia and the other former Soviet states?

The background reading has been designed to help you consider these questions. Part I surveys the history of U.S.-Russian relations from the 19th century to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Part II examines the transformation that Russia has undergone since 1992. Part III reviews the issues at the top of the U.S. agenda with respect to Russia and its neighbors.

Shared Interests

In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville, a French aristocrat and world traveller, predicted that the United States and Russia would eventually dominate the world. At the time of Tocqueville's observation, international power was concentrated in Western Europe,

particularly in Britain and France. Tocqueville, however, saw virtually boundless potential in the United States and Russia.

> *America's conquests are made with ploweshares, Russia's with the sword;...nevertheless, each seems called by some secret desire of Providence one day to hold in its hands the destinies of half the world.*
>
> *—Alexis de Tocqueville*

In terms of geography, the United States and Russia shared much in common. Both were enormous countries with vast frontiers and great natural wealth. But whereas the United States was guarded from overseas aggression by two great oceans and benefited from accessible ports on both coasts, Russia was militarily vulnerable and economically isolated.

How did geography affect Russia's development as a world power?

The broad plain that sweeps across Europe into the Russian heartland has left Russia open through history to overland invasion from the west. In addition, Russia's lack of ice-free ports has stifled trade and limited Russian naval strength.

As Tocqueville noted, geography placed both the United States and Russia on the path to world power. In addition, geography accounted for many of the differences in the two societies.

In contrast to the democratic, federal system of the United States, Russia in the 19th century was a highly centralized authoritarian state. The Russian tsars (a word that comes from the Roman title of "caesar") ruled their empire with almost unrestrained power. Government resources supported a huge military. Cannons, warships, and other items related to defense were produced with state funds.

What concerns did U.S. and Russian leaders share?

Despite their political differences, U.S. and Russian leaders shared a common concern during much of the 19th century — the British Empire. While the United States feared British meddling in North America, Russia struggled with Britain for influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. During the Crimean War of 1853-56, the United States favored Russia in its conflict with Britain, France, and Ottoman Turkey. Forty American doctors even went to Russia as volunteers to treat wounded Russian soldiers.

Mistrust of Britain also helped pave the way for the U.S.-Russian agreement on the sale of Alaska. In the early 19th century, Russia, Britain, the United States, and Spain each staked out territorial claims on the Pacific Coast of North America. Russian explorers reached the New World by way of Alaska, undertaking their first expeditions in the 1740s. By the 1800s, the Russian presence extended as far south as California. Like the Spanish colonies in the southwest, Russian trading posts were sparsely settled and poorly defended. Russian officials were particularly concerned that the British, who at the time controlled Canada, would seek to expand into Alaska. The Russians saw the United States as a counterweight to Britain and were eager to open negotiations with Washington on Alaska. The two sides quickly agreed in 1867 that the United States would buy the huge territory for $7 million.

> *We do not know in the entire world two states which could offer each other so many qualities promising friendship and alliance as Russia and the United States of America.*
>
> *—Birzhevye viedomosti (Stock reports), 1868*

U.S.-Russian relations took a turn for the worse when the United States entered the competition for empire at the turn of the century. With its victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States acquired colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific. In addition, U.S. trade interests in Asia and U.S. naval power were on the rise. As a result, U.S. and Russian ambitions increasingly came into conflict. In China, for example, the United States' desire for open trading relations collided with Russia's efforts to control the northeastern Chinese province of Manchuria.

How did the results of World War I affect U.S.-Russian Relations?

World War I forever changed U.S.-Russian relations and the balance of power in Europe. The United

States reluctantly entered the war in April 1917 on the side of Russia, Britain, and France. President Woodrow Wilson and a great majority of Americans had vigorously opposed U.S. involvement when fighting broke out in Europe in August 1914. However, German submarine attacks against American shipping and a growing fear that Germany would emerge as the dominant power in Europe convinced Wilson to join the Allies.

By the time the United States declared war, Russia was in chaos. On the battlefront, the Russian army had suffered nearly 4 million deaths and lost huge tracts of land to Germany. Politically, Tsar Nicholas II had been forced from power in March 1917. A democratic government had been established and vowed to continue the war, but increasing misery and instability undermined both the war effort and the new government. In November 1917, V.I. Lenin led a communist revolution in Russia. Lenin proclaimed a workers' state and pulled Russia out of the war.

Why was the United States suspicious of Lenin?

Like Britain, France, and other nations of the West, the United States was suspicious of Lenin and the communists. In the short term, Lenin's decision to sign a separate peace treaty with Germany increased the military pressure on the remaining Allies. More unsettling for the long term was Lenin's plan to spread the communist revolution worldwide. The Allies sent small contingents of troops to Russia to aid forces inside the country opposing the communists. By 1921, however, the communists had established control over much of the old Russian Empire. The following year, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), or Soviet Union, was officially formed.

The Soviets watched as the United States, Britain, and France molded the international system after the surrender of Germany and the other Central Powers in November 1918. At the Paris peace conference, the Allies redrew Russia's frontier without inviting Soviet participation. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Finland, were created from the old Russian Empire's lands. Most of Poland was formed from the territory of the empire, while Romania received the province of Bessarabia.

Why was the Soviet Union barred from the League of Nations?

The Soviets were likewise barred from joining the League of Nations, a global organization that was designed to settle international disputes and thwart aggression. (The U.S. Senate voted against American membership in the League in 1920, although the organization was largely a creation of President Wilson.) The strategy of the Allies was meant to isolate the Soviet Union internationally and block the spread of communism.

Why did Josef Stalin steer the Soviet Union towards industrialization?

Communism, in fact, made little headway after World War I. Except for the existence of a communist government in Hungary for a few months in 1919, communism failed to take root outside the borders of the old Russian Empire. Lenin's successor, Josef Stalin, turned the attention of the Soviet Union away from pursuing worldwide revolution and toward industrializing the backward Soviet economy. Stalin believed that the Soviet Union had to industrialize at all costs in order to defend communism against the capitalist countries of the West.

To achieve his goals, Stalin fashioned a "command economy." Under Stalin's rule, the state controlled all aspects of economic activity and directed the distribution of goods for the whole country. Government planners made every decision, from how much wheat would be grown to how many shoes would be manufactured. Soviet communism represented a rejection of the capitalist system of the United States, Britain, and other Western countries, where most economic decisions were made by individual producers and consumers.

The Soviet economic experiment won considerable admiration in the United States and Europe, especially after an economic depression struck the West in 1929. Some observers were attracted to the concept of government control over the economy. Others supported the emphasis on equality that was central to communist ideology. In the early 1930s, when one-quarter of the labor force in the United States was unemployed, Stalin could claim that the state provided everyone with a job in the Soviet

Union. Meanwhile, the closed nature of Soviet society smothered news about Stalin's reign of terror and network of prison camps that would take more than 10 million lives.

A single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic.

—Josef Stalin

How did the rise of Hitler change Western perceptions of the Soviet Union?

In the 1930s, the rise of Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler forced the leaders of the United States, Britain, and France to reconsider the balance of power in Europe. Containing German aggression became the chief foreign policy goal of the Western democracies. As a result, Western perceptions of the Soviet Union quickly shifted. Democratic leaders now saw the Soviets as a potential counterweight to Germany. In 1933, the United States established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The following year, the Soviets were admitted to the League of Nations.

Hitler and Stalin agreed that war between German Nazism and Soviet communism was inevitable. During the 1930s, both leaders pressed forward with plans for a rapid military buildup. Between 1933 and 1938, German defense spending increased ninefold, while the Soviets raised their military expenditures by fifteen times. By 1938, Nazi Germany's defense budget was the largest in the world — five times higher than U.S. levels.

He can't break this handclasp!

Harper in the Birmingham News-Herald, April 1945

What were the results of the "Pact of Steel?"

In August 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union stunned the West by signing a non-aggression treaty. The next month, Germany invaded Poland from the west, followed a few weeks later by the Soviets from the east. The so-called "Pact of Steel," however, proved temporary. In June 1941, Hitler directed his armed forces against the Soviet Union. The invasion was the first step in Hitler's grand strategy of repopulating the vast plains of the Soviet Union with German colonists.

The struggle between the Nazis and the Soviets was titanic. The Soviet Union lost 20 to 30 million people and saw its land devastated by the German onslaught. At Stalingrad alone — the battle that turned the tide of the war in the winter of 1942-43 — the death toll suffered by the Soviet army was more than three times the number of American deaths for the entire war.

World War II also resulted in an alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States. During the course of the war, the United States provided the Soviet Union with roughly $11 billion worth of military supplies, as well as crucial intelligence on German military operations. The shipment of 200 American fighter aircraft, for example, allowed the Soviets to mount a key counter-offensive against the Nazis in December 1941.

What was the outcome of the Yalta Conference?

By the time Josef Stalin met President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at the Black Sea resort of Yalta in February

1945, the Soviets were poised to play a decisive role in post-war Europe.

Stalin could rightfully claim that his country had shouldered the greatest burdens in fighting the Germans. "Uncle Joe," as Stalin was known to many Americans during the war, had also convinced Roosevelt that the Soviets were reliable allies. At Yalta, Stalin pledged to help the United States defeat Japan once the war with Germany was over. In exchange, the Soviets were allowed a freer hand in shaping the future of Eastern Europe.

How did the end of World War II affect the leading powers?

When soldiers from the United States and the Soviet Union shook hands on the banks of the Elbe River in central Germany on April 25, 1945, they were also greeting the beginnings of a new international order. World War II had crippled the old European power system. Nazi Germany was defeated and destroyed. Britain had bankrupted its economy in achieving victory. France and Italy faced poverty and social upheaval.

Among the leading powers, only the United States and the Soviet Union emerged from the war with a strengthened position in the international arena. The United States stood unrivaled as the mightiest nation on earth. Spared from attack, the U.S. economy had soared out of the depression to produce much of the equipment needed for the Allied war effort. Moreover, the United States in 1945 possessed the world's most advanced military and the only atomic weapons. The Soviet Union was a formidable force in its own right. Despite their enormous war losses, the Soviets had built up an army of 12 million soldiers to defeat Nazi Germany.

What did Winston Churchill mean by the "Iron Curtain?"

The alliance of World War II quickly dissolved once the fighting ended. By February 1946, Stalin predicted that the conflict between communism and capitalism would lead to a new war. Meanwhile, his troops remained firmly in place throughout much of Eastern Europe. Churchill had warned his U.S. allies of the Soviet threat even while World War II was raging. In 1946, after losing the prime minister's post, he became more convinced that Stalin was seeking to divide Europe in two. In March, Churchill presented his concerns to an American audience in Fulton, Missouri, that included a sympathetic President Harry Truman.

> *From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere.*
>
> *—Winston Churchill*

Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, however, represented a distant concern for most Americans at the close of World War II. President Roosevelt had acknowledged at the Yalta conference that public opinion would not permit U.S. troops to remain in Europe for more than two years after the war. President Roosevelt based his assessment on the traditional American distaste for involvement in European affairs.

Containing Soviet expansion

A shift in American attitudes began within a small circle of U.S. policymakers led by George F. Kennan. A diplomat at the U.S. embassy in Moscow during World War II, Kennan sent an 8,000-word cable to the State Department in February 1946 that dismissed the possibility of cooperating with the Soviet Union. Kennan believed that the Soviet system was based on paranoid hostility toward the outside world and proposed that the United States seek to contain the expansion of Soviet communism. In the long run, Kennan felt, communist ideology would lose its aggressive edge and begin to soften. Kennan's memorandum was circulated widely among U.S. policymakers. In 1947, it served as the basis for an article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" that appeared in the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs*.

Kennan's concept of "containment" gradually

came to shape the policies of those in the Truman administration who wanted to stand up to the Soviets in Europe. In March 1947, President Truman announced his intent to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure."

What two policies provided the foundation for the Truman Doctrine?

Known as the Truman Doctrine, the policy statement was linked to a request to Congress for military aid to Greece and Turkey. Although few Americans were deeply interested in the Greek civil war or Soviet territorial claims in Turkey, communist aggression was increasingly viewed as a serious menace.

The Truman Doctrine rested on two expensive U.S. commitments. In April 1948, Congress approved the European Recovery Program after lengthy debate. Better known as the Marshall Plan, the program was an economic aid package that invested $12.5 billion (about $90 billion in 2000 dollars) into the reconstruction of sixteen European states from 1948 to 1952. Although they were invited to participate, the Soviets refused U.S. assistance, and barred their Eastern European satellites from accepting aid.

Militarily, the United States joined with ten countries of Western Europe and Canada in 1949 to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). By 1955, NATO had expanded to include thirteen European members, including West Germany. With the signing of the NATO treaty, the United States committed itself to the defense of Western Europe and pledged for the first time in history to maintain a substantial U.S. troop presence overseas.

Why were Americans worried about the global political climate in the early 1950s?

The United States in 1950 was in many respects at its zenith in global power. The U.S. share of the world's income was 52 percent. Americans held 49 percent of international financial reserves. The United States produced approximately half of the world's oil and steel. And yet, many Americans were deeply worried by the international political climate. In less than a decade, the United States had been thrust into the role of global policeman. Senator Robert Taft and others warned that too much emphasis on foreign affairs and military strength would warp American democratic values. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace feared that Truman's policies would "divide Europe into two warring camps" and hoped to promote international cooperation through the United Nations. The opinions of Taft, Wallace, and others had been aired at thousands of town-hall meetings throughout the country while the Marshall Plan was debated in Congress. By 1950, however, most Americans were prepared, perhaps reluctantly, to shoulder greater international responsibilities.

It is one thing to agree to go to war with Russia if it attacks Western Europe. It is another to send American ground troops to defend Norway or Denmark or Holland or Italy or even France and England.

—Senator Robert Taft

The consensus that emerged around U.S. Cold War policies was shaped in large part by international events. In June 1948, the Soviets imposed a blockade on the western part of Berlin to unify the German capital under communism. (Western Berlin had been placed under U.S., British, and French control after the division of the city following the war.) With overland traffic cut off by the surrounding Soviet forces, the United States and its allies airlifted 8,000 tons of supplies daily to western Berlin. The Berlin blockade lasted almost a year until the Soviets backed down.

More ominous developments followed. In September 1949, the Soviets exploded their first atomic bomb. The next month, communists led by Mao Zedong won control of mainland China and joined Moscow in pressing for the spread of communism worldwide. In June 1950, communist North Korean forces invaded South Korea, drawing the United States into a three-year conflict that ended in a stalemate.

BALANCE OF TERROR

By the mid-1950s, U.S. leaders had given up on the idea that the frontier of communism in Eastern Europe could be rolled back by force. President

Dwight D. Eisenhower rejected appeals that the United States respond militarily when the Soviets sent tanks into Hungary in 1956 to crush the independent-minded government there. Rather, U.S. leaders reluctantly accepted the Soviet sphere of influence in Hungary and elsewhere behind the "Iron Curtain." At the same time, Eisenhower and his successors believed that the United States had no choice but to maintain its role as a military superpower.

How did Soviet nuclear weapons force the United States to rethink national security?

Moscow's development of nuclear weapons forced American defense planners to devise a new approach to national security. U.S. conventional, or non-nuclear, forces were built up. Without a nuclear monopoly, Truman and Eisenhower bolstered the U.S. presence in Western Europe to deter Soviet aggression. By 1953, the number of American troops in the region had reached 431,000, and over half of the U.S. military budget was earmarked for defending Europe. Meanwhile, American policymakers hoped to maintain their head start in the arms race. In 1947, Truman ordered that 400 nuclear weapons be ready by 1953. Under Eisenhower, the doctrine of "massive retaliation" committed the United States to use nuclear weapons to counter a Soviet attack on Western Europe.

What was the Cuban missile crisis?

The arms race came close to erupting into nuclear war in October 1962 when the Soviets attempted to secretly install nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba. After discovering Moscow's preparations, President John F. Kennedy demanded that the missiles be withdrawn. Kennedy imposed a naval blockade on Cuba and warned that the United States would take stronger military action to remove the Soviet installations. Nearly two weeks of tension followed before the Soviets backed down.

U.S.-Soviet Detente

As Western Europe recovered from World War II, the primary arena of U.S.-Soviet confrontation shifted to Asia, Africa, and Latin America — the so-

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called Third World. Vietnam was one of the main flashpoints. The war the United States waged against communism in Southeast Asia had been inherited from France. The French had been the colonial rulers of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for nearly a century before leaving the region in defeat in 1954. U.S. policymakers viewed the effort to protect the anti-communist government in South Vietnam as part of the global battle against communist expansion.

> *[The United States will] pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to ensure the survival and the success of liberty.*
>
> —*John Kennedy*

By the end of the 1960s, U.S. involvement in Vietnam had compelled many Americans to reconsider their country's role in the world. From George Kennan's original focus on Europe, the U.S. policy of containing Soviet communism had widened into a

global enterprise. As opposition to the Vietnam War deepened after 1968, U.S. policymakers increasingly sought to define the limits of American interests.

At the same time, long-standing assumptions of the Cold War were being challenged by larger shifts in international relations. In the 1950s and 1960s, Western Europe and Japan had moved quickly to close the economic gap with the United States. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had nearly caught up to the United States in military power.

How did President Nixon change U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union?

President Richard M. Nixon led the reassessment of U.S. foreign policy. In Congress and as Eisenhower's vice president, Nixon had built his political career around staunch anti-communism. In 1972, however, he visited China and the Soviet Union. The trip to Moscow was highlighted by the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), a major agreement between the two superpowers on controlling nuclear weapons. This opened an era of "*detente*." Nixon hoped *detente* (French for the relaxation of tensions) would produce a new set of rules for superpower conduct and prevent international crises such as the Berlin blockade. The Soviets, for their part, saw the improvement in relations as an acknowledgment of their status as an equal of the United States.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union share an overriding desire to achieve a more stable peace in the world.

—*Richard Nixon*

Much of the impetus behind *detente* came from the tremendous buildup of Soviet nuclear forces during the 1960s. After being pressured to withdraw their nuclear missiles from Cuba in 1962 by U.S. military superiority, Soviet leaders vowed to erase the nuclear advantage that the United States had long enjoyed. For the remainder of the decade, the Soviets invested heavily in their nuclear program.

Meanwhile, the Soviets made it clear that they would use force to maintain the communist system in the Soviet bloc. The most notable challenge to Moscow — a budding reform movement within the Czechoslovak leadership — was smashed in 1968 by Soviet troops.

How did detente change U.S.-Soviet relations?

By the mid-1970s, *detente* had recast superpower relations. The new order was affirmed by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a gathering in Helsinki, Finland, that brought together the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, and thirty-two European countries. The agreement that was produced by the CSCE in 1975 recognized the division of Europe into two camps and guaranteed human rights. In addition, the two Cold War alliances permitted representatives from the opposing side to observe their military maneuvers, thus reducing the likelihood of a surprise attack.

Soviet leaders hailed the accord as legitimizing their domination over East Germany. At the same time, the citizen groups that formed in the Soviet bloc to monitor the human rights provisions of the agreement became a thorn in their side.

What events led to the collapse of detente?

As the 1970s came to a close, *detente* became less meaningful. In 1976, the Soviets raised anxiety among NATO leaders by aiming a new generation of highly accurate nuclear missiles at Western Europe. Meanwhile, Moscow resented the emphasis on human rights in the foreign policy of President Jimmy Carter. *Detente* collapsed altogether in December 1979 when the Soviet army invaded neighboring Afghanistan to prop up a pro-Soviet government. The Carter administration responded by imposing an embargo on trade with the Soviet Union and boycotting the 1980 summer Olympic games in Moscow. An arms control treaty, known as SALT II, stalled in the U.S. Senate. U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated further with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. Spurning *detente*, Reagan came to office attacking the USSR as the "evil empire" and calling for an increase in U.S. defense spending.

In the Soviet Union, the reassertion of U.S. military power prompted the Soviet leadership to reconsider the USSR's role in the world. In the mid-

1980s, Moscow found itself bogged down in a costly war against Muslim guerrillas in Afghanistan, while at home the Soviet economy stagnated. Politically, the country was facing uncertainty too. When Leonid Brezhnev died in 1982, he was replaced by an aged member of his inner circle, Yuri Andropov who died within 15 months. Konstantin Chernenko succeeded Andropov, but died a year after assuming power. After Chernenko's death, power in the Soviet Union passed to the representative of a younger generation, Mikhail Gorbachev.

Gorbachev's New Thinking

By the time Mikhail Gorbachev was selected to head the Soviet Communist Party in 1985, his country was struggling to keep up with its Cold War rival. Internationally, the Soviet system had lost much of its appeal in the Third World. At home, the Soviet economy itself was beset by corruption and inefficiency. More significantly for Moscow's global ambitions, Soviet science and technology were falling further behind the West.

How was Gorbachev different than earlier Soviet leaders?

Gorbachev represented a marked contrast to the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev. In his mid-fifties, energetic, and open to new ideas, Gorbachev stood apart from the generation of communist officials stamped by memories of Stalin and World War II. He recognized that the Soviet Union would need to undergo serious change to maintain its superpower status. Initially, Gorbachev tried to spur greater productivity and discipline among Soviet workers. He launched a campaign against alcohol abuse by reducing the availability of vodka and other spirits. In dealing with Moscow's Eastern European satellites, Gorbachev pressed for greater diplomatic unity and more favorable terms of trade for the Soviet Union. The new Soviet leader's early efforts, however, failed to halt the Soviet Union's decline. In 1987, Gorbachev unveiled a more sweeping set of reforms to reinvigorate the Soviet Union. *Perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) opened up Soviet society to the outside world like never before.

> *We must not pretend that everything goes smoothly....If we are silent about some shortcomings, they will inevitably grow.*
>
> —*Mikhail Gorbachev*

Gorbachev hoped that greater contact with the West would bring new technology and investment into the Soviet Union. A key element of his strategy stressed improving Moscow's international image. Gorbachev proved especially bold in proposing arms control initiatives with the United States. Ironically, his partner on the U.S. side of the Cold War thaw was Ronald Reagan, a stalwart opponent of *detente* during his first term in office.

How did Gorbachev's policies change international relations?

Gorbachev's policies were equivalent to an earthquake in international relations. Many of the basic principles that had guided U.S. policymakers were suddenly called into question by Moscow's new outlook. The tremors also shook Eastern Europe. Although Gorbachev had no intention of giving up the Soviet Union's Eastern European empire, he was not willing to use military force to maintain control over Moscow's satellites. The first challenges to communist authority occurred in Poland and Hungary in 1988, where democratic movements forced government officials to open up the political process. In 1989, popular pressure brought down old-line communist regimes not just in Poland and Hungary, but also in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. The historical drama continued into 1990, when West and East Germany were reunified after forty-five years of division.

Disintegration of the Soviet Union

The revolutions in Eastern Europe and the reunification of Germany were hailed throughout the world as a victory for democracy. In the Soviet Union, however, public opinion was mixed. Many Soviets, particularly those with memories of World War II, felt that control over Eastern Europe and the presence of 370,000 Soviet troops in East Germany provided a

buffer against outside attack and affirmed the Soviet Union's status as a superpower.

How did events in Eastern Europe contribute to the Soviet Republics' desire for autonomy?

In contrast, many peoples within the Soviet Union were emboldened by events in Eastern Europe. Since 1988, national groups in the Soviet Union's republics had been campaigning for greater control over their own affairs. In 1990, Lithuania was the first of the Soviet Union's fifteen republics to openly declare independence from Moscow. Although Gorbachev cut off supplies of heating oil to Lithuania and sent in troops to occupy Communist Party property, other republics, including Russia itself, continued to seek more autonomy from the central government.

How did perestroika contribute to the weakening of the government's authority?

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union's economic reforms had stalled. Under Gorbachev's program of *perestroika*, Moscow's grip on the Soviet economy was relaxed. Factory managers and farm directors were given greater decision-making power. The Soviet Union also had become more open to foreign investment. But *perestroika* was a halfway measure. Gorbachev feared that lifting price controls and taking other measures to create a free-market economy would turn people against the Soviet system and undermine the authority of the Communist Party.

By 1990, the Soviet economy was in a tailspin. The country's economic output fell 8 percent that year. The next year it dropped 19 percent. Instead of sparking initiative, *perestroika* contributed to a breakdown of the chain of command that tied local enterprises to the central government, without really giving managers freedom to act.

Faced with mounting problems and conflicting demands, Gorbachev struggled to hold onto power. Politically, he walked a tightrope between reformers and hard-liners. In 1991, the Soviet leader increasingly surrounded himself with conservative officials. At the

Countries of the Former Soviet Union

Country	Population (1999)	Area in square miles	Per capita GDP (1998)	Exports (1998)	Imports (1998)
Russia	145,000,000	6,591,027	$4,000	$71.8 bil.	$58.5 bil.
Ukraine	49,800,000	233,028	$2,200	$11.3 bil.	$13.0 bil.
Uzbekistan	24,100,000	172,696	$2,500	$4.1 bil.	$3.8 bil.
Kazakstan	16,900,000	1,048,878	$3,100	$5.7 bil.	$7.4 bil.
Belarus	10,400,000	80,134	$5,200	$7 bil.	$6.8 bil.
Azerbaijan	7,900,000	33,428	$1,640	$781 mil.	$794 mil.
Tajikistan	6,100,000	55,237	$990	$740 mil.	$850 mil.
Georgia	5,100,000	26,904	$2,200	$230 mil.	$930 mil.
Kyrgyzstan	4,500,000	76,621	$2,200	$630 mil.	$670 mil.
Moldova	4,500,000	13,008	$2,700	$633 mil.	$1 bil.
Turkmenistan	4,400,000	188,407	$1,630	$1.1 bil.	$689 mil.
Lithuania	3,400,000	25,167	$4,900	$4.2 bil.	$5.9 bil.
Armenia	3,400,000	11,503	$2,700	$230 mil.	$840 mil.
Latvia	2,400,000	24,743	$4,100	$1.9 bil.	$3.1 bil.
Estonia	1,400,000	17,409	$5,560	$2.6 bil.	$3.4 bil.

same time, Gorbachev opened negotiations with leaders from the Soviet Union's fifteen republics on establishing a new relationship with the central government. In August 1991, the tightrope snapped under Gorbachev's feet. Hard-line communists launched a coup to reassert the power of the central government. The coup organizers, though, had little active support outside the top ranks of the Communist Party. Within three days, their plot collapsed.

How did the failed coup accelerate the demise of the Soviet Union?

Following the coup, the pace of change in the Soviet Union accelerated. Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin, who had stood up to the forces of the coup from atop an armored personnel carrier in front of the Russian parliament building, moved decisively to transfer power from the central government to the Russian Republic. The three Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were quickly recognized as independent states. Other republics soon followed.

The final death blow to the Soviet Union came in December 1991, when leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus announced the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Unable to hold the USSR together, Gorbachev resigned as Soviet president. On December 25, 1991 the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

Part II: Keeping Up with a Changing Russia

For more than seven decades, the Soviet Union was dominated by the Communist Party. Political opposition was not tolerated. In the final years of Mikhail Gorbachev's rule, however, the Communist Party's hold over society crumbled. The failure of the August 1991 coup marked the end of the road for the one-party system. The new era has shown signs of promise. In contrast to past generations, Russians today are free to voice their opinions and travel abroad. Russia has held presidential and parliamentary elections that were judged to be relatively fair.

On the other hand, since the summer of 1991, successive waves of political and economic tumult have washed away the memory of Yeltsin's courageous stand in the Russian capital. Corruption has funneled enormous wealth into the hands of a few, economic reform hurt more people than it helped, and political divisions have repeatedly paralyzed the government. Finally, Russia's fall from its position as an international superpower and inability to successfully conduct a war in Chechnya produced a widespread sense of humiliation and resentment. Not surprisingly, Russians came to regard politicians as incompetent or corrupt.

In this part of the background reading, you will learn more about the stops and starts of Russia's transition since 1992. Russia's future is particularly important for Americans. As you will learn in Part III of the background reading, our country's foreign policy will be shaped in large part by developments in Russia.

Democracy Russian Style

The new Russian state began its life without a stable political system. Unlike the United States and other mature democracies, Russia lacks a tradition in which two or three well-established political parties compromise and share power. Rather, political competition in the new Russia has often revolved around clashes among Russia's wealthiest men—often referred to as the oligarchs. Disputes have been bitter, even violent, with political rivals often taking a winner-take-all approach.

The 1996 presidential campaign — the first since the collapse of the Soviet Union — illustrated the influence of the oligarchs. Russia's seven leading oligarchs, fearing the election of the communist Gennady Zyuganov, spent millions to re-elect Yeltsin. They also used the two major television networks under their control to polish Yeltsin's image. Yeltsin defeated his communist rival 54 to 40 percent. In the months before the vote, Yeltsin spent billions of rubles to increase pensions to the elderly, give tax breaks to industry, and pay back wages to workers who had gone for months without their salaries.

Why were some Russians pleased with the resignation of President Boris Yeltsin?

The resignation of President Yeltsin on December 31, 1999 and the appointment of his Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, as acting President created an atmosphere of hope among many Russians. Putin used the time between his appointment and the Presidential elections in March 2000 to project an image as a strong, competent leader by vowing to stamp out corruption and to defeat the rebel forces in Chechnya.

Putin won the election handily, winning nearly 54 percent of the vote. His nearest opponent, Gennady Zyuganov of the Communist party won only 29 percent of the vote.

The two presidential and parliamentary elections have established political standards for Russia. Election observers agreed that there has been little fraud in counting the ballots, and the results have been accepted without violence. A healthy turnout at the polls for the 1999 parliamentary race and for the 2000 presidential race suggests that Russian voters value their democratic right to elect their leaders.

What are the political divisions in Russian politics?

Elections have also defined the dividing lines in Russian politics. When Russians went to the polls in 1999, they elected a parliament which reflects the full range of political viewpoints in Russia.

Liberal democrats: At one end of the spectrum are advocates of liberal democracy. They hope that Russia's political and economic system will come to resemble that of the West. The reformers crafted many of Yeltsin's free-market economic policies and have been widely blamed for their country's problems. Nonetheless, they believe that time is on their side. They expect their appeal to increase as a new generation learns to value the principles of economic opportunity and individual freedom. Grigory Yavlinsky has been the most prominent democratic reformer. In the 2000 presidential elections, he finished third with 6 percent of the vote.

Jack Ohman. Reprinted by permission: Tribune Media Services

Communists and nationalists: The liberal democrats have met fierce opposition from the communists and nationalists. The communists and nationalists are united by a conviction that Russia is unique. They often speak of their country's *sobornost* (meaning "spiritual unity") to distinguish Russian culture from what they see as the excessive individualism and materialism of the West. The communists and nationalists have tapped into the popular backlash against economic change, especially among the elderly, factory workers, and other groups that have suffered under reform.

> *Russia is a special world...a special type of civilization...hostile in its soul to the West.*
>
> *—Gennady Zyuganov, communist leader*

The communists constitute an important part of Russia's Duma, or lower house of parliament. In the 1999 parliamentary elections, the communists were the most successful party, gaining one-quarter of the seats in the legislature. President Putin has made early efforts to work with the communists, who often blocked efforts of the Yeltsin government. Putin gave the communists some important committees and the important speaker's chair in exchange for their support of his policies.

Pragmatic moderates: The middle ground in Russian politics has been occupied by pragmatic moderates. Many have been elected as mayors and provincial governors in recent years. The pragmatists pay little attention to political parties and ideologies. Rather, they are preoccupied with solving everyday problems and consolidating their own power. Practical concerns also shape their attitude toward foreign relations.

What influence do the oligarchs have on Russian politics?

Just as important as the political parties at the forefront of Russian politics are the interest groups and oligarchs behind the scenes. For them, politics is less about issues and ideas than about control of Russia's key industrial, financial, and military institutions. Russia's most powerful oligarchs have put together wide-ranging business empires, largely through government connections. Their assets typically include energy and mining facilities, factories, banks, and perhaps a newspaper or television station. Each maintains close ties with top politicians and organized crime.

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Why does Vladimir Putin want to reduce the power of regional leaders?

Today, under President Putin, another far-reaching struggle for power is taking place in the new Russia. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, leaders of Russia's eighty-nine regions increasingly challenged the supremacy of the central government.

Under Boris Yeltsin, regional leaders had reason to believe they could act independently. For the first time in Russian history, they owed their offices to democratic elections rather than to appointments from Moscow. Some of the regional leaders became corrupt or autocratic—or both. Many have been quick to strike deals with foreign companies without much regard for the foreign policy implications or the laws imposed from Moscow. As many as 40 percent of all regional laws enacted by these regional leaders violate federal legislation or the Russian Constitution

How does Putin hope to control the power of regional leaders?

President Putin has plans to authorize full federal funding for courts allowing them to act independently of regional control. He also has appointed administrative leaders in seven regions of the country who report directly to him.

Putin has threatened to remove the 89 governors and their legislative leaders from their seats in the Federation Council—Russia's counterpart to the United States Senate. Putin is also seeking the legal authority to fire any governor who flouts federal law.

How have ethnic differences contributed to regional problems?

For more than 20 million Muslims within Russia, regional politics has an ethnic dimension. After the Soviet collapse, Yeltsin sought to win over non-Russian regions by transferring authority to the local level. In 1994, he signed an agreement with Tatarstan, a predominantly Muslim republic in central Russia. Yeltsin gave Tatar leaders broad decision-making power over local affairs and allowed them to keep a large share of the tax revenue on oil production in the republic.

In sharp contrast, in the southern border region of Chechnya, Yeltsin responded with force after failing to come to terms with the republic's leaders. The results were both tragic and disastrous. Russia's huge army was outmaneuvered by Chechen guerrilla forces in fighting that began in December 1994. Roughly 60,000 people died before a peace settlement was reached in the summer of 1996.

How did violence in Chechnya help Putin's campaign for President?

In the fall of 1999, fighting flared up again between Russian troops and Chechens. Two incidents provoked a strong response from Moscow. Islamic rebels from Chechnya invaded the region of Dagestan. Yeltsin appointed Putin as Prime Minister the following day. In addition, a series of bomb explosions in Moscow apartment buildings that killed several hundred Russians were blamed on the Chechens. This solidified Russian public opinion behind a vigorous prosecution of the war. Vladimir Putin increased his popularity by leading a more aggressive and successful campaign against the Chechens. To many Russians, his competent, strong leadership against a hated foe made him the candidate of choice in the presidential elections.

The situation in the [Chechen] republic has become complicated to such a level that the territory has become a springboard for the expansion of international terrorism into Russia.

—Vladimir Putin

Russia's use of massive military force in Chechnya resulted in the widespread displacement and deaths of civilians. Widespread allegations of human rights abuses by Russian troops have also brought Putin's government under criticism from the West. The Russian government claims that foreigners are fighting along side the Chechens and that Russia has little choice but to respond forcefully.

Coping with Economic Change

At the eye of Russia's political storm has been the country's economic crisis. Since 1989, when the old

Soviet economy began turning sharply downward. Russia's economic output has shrunk by over half (twice as deep a drop as America suffered during the depression of the 1930s). Private ownership has largely replaced state control as the foundation of the economy. A handful of Russians amassed fortunes in this privatization of state industries, while the great majority have seen their living standards plunge.

Much of the old Soviet economic system was torn down in the months following the failed coup of August 1991. The initiative at the time belonged to a group of bold economic reformers who formed the inner circle of Yeltsin's government. With the help of advisers from the United States and other Western countries, they drafted a program known as "shock therapy" to lay the groundwork for a free-market economy in Russia.

What were the components of shock therapy?

The most important changes began in January 1992. Price controls were lifted on 90 percent of the goods sold in Russia. Government spending was slashed and plans were drawn up to place state-run companies in the hands of private owners. The "Boys in Reeboks," as the team of economic advisers was called, realized that many of the inefficient, state-run factories that had been kept alive during the Soviet era would have to close or drastically trim their work forces. They predicted, however, that free-market competition would give rise to new companies and generate new jobs.

Yeltsin's popularity at first overwhelmed many of shock therapy's opponents. By the summer of 1992, the factory managers, farm directors, and other defenders of the old Soviet economic system were ready to fight back. The main point of contention was the budget. The reformers favored cutting government subsidies to state-run industries. Their opponents countered that the reform plan would result in economic chaos.

How did disagreements over economic policy lead to civil unrest?

The political tug-of-war muddied the economic picture. Critics of shock therapy succeeded in maintaining the flow of government subsidies to big industries. Consequently, unemployment rose only slightly. Government presses, however, were working overtime to print money so that state-run factories and farms could pay their workers. At the same time, government officials imposed heavy taxes to hold down the budget deficit. In 1992, prices for consumer goods increased 25 times. Production fell by 19 percent, while the buying power of workers dropped by more than 40 percent. In 1993, prices increased another nine times and production dropped by 12 percent.

By September 1993, the confrontation over economic policy led Yeltsin to dissolve parliament. Street violence between anti-Yeltsin forces and troops loyal to the president erupted in Moscow in early October. The clash left the top floors of the Russian parliament in flames and killed at least 140 people. Although Yeltsin defeated his political foes, his country's economic performance failed to generate support for the free market.

Mike Keefe in The Denver Post. Used with permission.

What were the initial results of economic reform?

The shock waves from Russia's initial leap toward economic reform gradually settled after 1993, but without bringing about the changes that economic reformers had anticipated. Few of the new businesses they had expected to see sprout actually materialized. Only a small trickle of investment entered the economy, not the ample flow that had been forecast.

Meanwhile, the central government proved unable to put its fiscal house in order. At the insistence of the Duma, subsidies continued to flow. Tax evasion was widespread, depriving the government of badly needed revenue. Basic government services, such as education, health care, and road maintenance, were starved of funding.

Russia's budget problems eventually rippled through the entire economy. Companies that did not receive payment from the government typically refused to pay other companies with which they did business. In turn, workers who went without their paychecks were unable to meet their bills for housing, electricity, heating, and other services.

To make matters worse, a drop in energy prices in the mid-1990s reduced government revenue from exports of oil and gas. Moscow was compelled to increase its borrowing from foreign lenders. In August 1998, confidence in the Russian ruble collapsed. Within a few days, the value of Russia's currency compared to the dollar dropped more than threefold.

How did Yeltsin respond to Russia's economic crisis in August 1998?

The fall of the ruble triggered a new economic crisis in Russia. Yeltsin was forced to appoint a new prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov, who was more acceptable to the communists and nationalists of the Duma. Primakov was to last as prime minister for nine months. Yeltsin, battling accusations of corruption, incompetence, and rising dissatisfaction with worsening economic conditions would change prime ministers three times in a year, before settling on Vladimir Putin in August of 1999.

How has a new Russian economy replaced the Soviet economy?

The challenges now facing President Putin are considerable. After years of reform, all but a few vital sectors of Russia's economy, such as defense, nuclear energy, and transportation, have been placed under private ownership. Russia's integration into the world marketplace doomed many of the country's manufacturing industries.

Virtually gone are the industries that once produced household electronics, textiles, and other consumer goods for the closed Soviet market. In most cases, Russian factories have been unable to compete with the flood of foreign imports. They have also lacked the funding to improve quality and upgrade productivity.

Most of Russia's new private owners have invested little in new equipment and technology. Rather, they have viewed their acquisitions as sources of quick cash, often stripping them of parts and scrap metal for sale abroad.

How does the old Soviet system still affect the current economy?

The Soviet past has been an especially heavy burden for Russia's big industrial firms. The closed nature of the Soviet economy discouraged technological innovation, leaving many Russian factories with outdated and inefficient equipment. Moreover, Soviet industry was particularly wasteful of raw materials and energy. For example, the Soviet Union used 80 percent more steel than the United States, even though its economy was less than half the size of the U.S. economy.

The Soviet system led to nightmarish pollution as well. In many areas, industrial wastes were dumped untreated into rivers and lakes. Sixty-one million Russians already live under environmentally dangerous conditions. In 120 Russian cities, air pollution levels are five times higher than acceptable, according to Russia's own standards. One million tons of oil—the equivalent of 25 Exxon Valdez spills—leak out of pipelines and into Russia's soil and water every month. The Russian news agency Tass reports that 30 percent of Chechnya is an ecological disaster zone, thanks in part to the 26 oil wells that have been on fire nonstop for months. At least for the moment, cleaning up the environment has been overshadowed by the demands of the marketplace.

The failings of the Soviet system have lived on in the countryside as well. More than 95 percent of the country's agricultural land remains under the control of huge, inefficient state-run farms. Poor management and lack of investment have forced Russia to import one-third of its food. Recent grain harvests have fallen short of government prediction by nearly 20 percent, even though demand for grain is down due to reduction in the livestock population. The Russian government has been compelled to accept millions of tons of donated wheat from the United States to feed its people.

Have foreign investors helped Russia enter the global marketplace?

Foreign investors, including many U.S. companies, have put brand names on the shelves in Russia, but most have invested in retailing rather than manufacturing. Pepsi, Bacardi, Milky Way, McDonald's, Calvin Klein, Polaroid and other popular brand names have won a niche in the Russian market while contributing little to Russia's economic development. Compared to the former communist economies of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, Russia has lagged behind in attracting foreign investors.

Why has Russia become increasingly dependent on the sale of raw materials?

As manufacturing has declined, Russia has become increasingly dependent on the output of raw materials. In 1999, almost half of Russia's exports consisted of oil and gas. Exports of Russian machinery and equipment represented 5 percent of Russia's sales abroad. Hopes for Russia's economic recovery are thus based largely on raw materials. With one-third of the world's natural gas and about one-quarter of global reserves for coal, diamonds, gold, aluminum, and nickel, Russia's natural resources are unmatched.

Over the long term, however, economists predict that Russia's energy and mining industries will need foreign investment to improve efficiency. In the 1980s, Soviet oil output ranked first in the world. Since 1987, however, oil production has fallen by half—below the levels of Saudi Arabia and the United States. Sharp increases in the price of oil and natural gas may help spur investment and improve the economy.

What has been the outcome of privatization?

The big winners in Russia's economic transformation are those who took advantage of privatization to gain a stake in profitable companies. The process gave government and industry officials from the Soviet era an inside track to buy valuable state assets at rock-bottom prices. Many of the state firms sold to private investors inherited monopoly privileges from the Soviet era. Their owners have often used their money and influence to stifle competition, claim questionable tax breaks, and gain access to special import and export licenses.

Before the fall of the ruble in 1998, Boris Berezovsky, one of Russia's wealthiest oligarchs, bragged that he and six others controlled half of their country's economy. Worse yet for Russia's long-term prospects,

they continue to funnel billions of dollars into bank accounts overseas rather than investing at home.

President Vladimir Putin gained popularity during his presidential campaign by promising to crack down on the corruption and power of the oligarchs. Early in his presidency one of them, Vladimir Gusinsky, was arrested and charged with illegally obtaining property in the privatization process. Gusinsky owns a television station that has been critical of the government's campaign in Chechnya. Putin's critics claimed that this was an attempt to stifle the freedom of the press.

How has the new economic system changed the principles of Russian society?

The dismantling of the Soviet economic system has turned Russian society on its head. Throughout much of Russian history, and especially during the Soviet era, economic equality was a core principle of Russian society. Suspicion and envy were often directed at those who climbed above their neighbors financially. Since the fall of communism, equality has taken a back seat to economic opportunity. The gap between the rich and the poor in Russia is now among the world's widest.

What role does organized crime play in Russia?

The old social order has been demolished too. Violent crime has soared in recent years. Criminal gangs have made extortion and drug trafficking commonplace, contributing to a murder rate over twice as high as that of the United States. In many Russian cities, shopkeepers, small factory owners, and other businessmen are forced to pay protection money to the Russian Mafia. Members of Russia's business elite are constantly ringed by bodyguards and travel in bullet-proof cars.

How has new economy changed the daily financial concerns of Russians?

These sudden changes have shocked Russians accustomed to the economic security and law and order of the Soviet system. Few people other than the Communist Party elite in the Soviet era would have been considered rich by American standards, but neither was there much desperate poverty. Soviet officials kept down costs for housing, bread, utilities, public transportation, and other basic necessities through government subsidies.

> *When are we going to stop destroying this country so that a few hundred people can be richer than anyone else in the world?*
>
> —*Labor Union Leader*

Increasingly, the pressures of the marketplace, reductions in government spending, and new bankruptcy laws have forced employers to lay off workers. By 2000, unemployment had risen to 12.6 percent. Much more common are ailing enterprises that have not raised salaries in line with inflation. Others have withheld wages for months at a time. Most struggling workers lack the skills and initiative to make a living in the new economy. Meanwhile, they are finding that they can expect only meager help from the government.

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

In human terms, the losers in Russia's transformation far outnumber the winners. According to the Russian government, one-third of the country's population gets by on less than $32 a month. Women, elderly pensioners, and farm workers have been especially hard hit. Rising rates of malnutrition, disease, and alcoholism have the country heading for a serious health crisis.

Why has life expectancy decreased in Russia?

Mortality rates for working-age Russians are now higher than they were a century ago. Life expectancy for Russian men has steadily fallen since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The average Russian boy born in 2000 is expected to live only fifty-nine years (as compared to seventy-two years in the United States). Health experts blame in part high rates of smoking and alcoholism, but they also report a growing failure to vaccinate children against preventable diseases and an increase in birth defects that may be linked to the environmental abuses of the Soviet era.

Not only has life expectancy declined, the birth rates have dropped as well. Russians, not sure of a secure future, are simply not having children. In the first four months of 2000, deaths outnumbered births by a factor of nearly two-to-one. If this trend continues, and experts think that it is not easily reversible, Russia's population will shrink by one third to 100 million by 2025.

Is there hope for the Russian economy?

In the long run, Russia enjoys economic advantages that may eventually pay off. The country has a well-educated work force and a large market for local businesses. The framework of Russia's financial and legal system, while shaky by Western standards, nonetheless puts Russia ahead of China and other developing economies.

A small middle class is beginning to regain a foothold in Russian society, mainly in Moscow and other large cities. Entrepreneurs capable of adjusting to the tastes of well-off Russian consumers have also been among the success stories.

In addition, Russia's high-tech industries in weapons, metals, space research, and nuclear technology are competitive in the world market. The economic chaos of 1998 did not prevent Russia from putting the first component of the international space station into orbit. There are even bright spots within Russia's heavy industrial sector. The directors of Uralmash, for example, have cut their work force nearly in half and have formed a joint venture with two American companies. Uralmash products now include a new model of oil rig that better meets the conditions of Russia's oil fields.

Russia's Foreign Policy

The new Russia occupies a unique position in world affairs. Its nuclear weapons and huge military befit the ambitions of a superpower. The worldview of its policymakers has been shaped by centuries of Russian expansion in which Russia's position in the world was the focus of government. Yet, the economic woes of today's Russia have deprived Moscow of the means to pursue an assertive foreign policy.

Why did the Russia initially overlook it ties with other states of the Former Soviet Union?

In the wake of the Soviet collapse, Russia initially sought to build new bridges to the West. The emphasis on close relations with the West led the Yeltsin administration to overlook its ties with the other states of the former Soviet Union. Russia's foreign minister did not make his first tour of the other FSU countries until April 1992.

While Russia neglected its former Soviet neighbors, the full impact of the Soviet Union's disintegration hit home. Under the Soviet system, the republics had been linked economically not only to Moscow, but to each other. Without a framework to sort out economic relations, many of the ties that had held together the Soviet economy unraveled. Russian factory directors were suddenly cut off from vital supplies of parts and raw materials. Trade among Russia and the other FSU states plummeted, contributing in large part to the region's economic crisis.

With respect to defense, Russia lost possession of radar stations, air bases, and other key military installations located elsewhere in the FSU. These

facilities had been deliberately built on the periphery of the Soviet Union to protect the heartland of the country from attack.

Meanwhile, Russia's borders with its former Soviet neighbors were poorly defended and geographically vulnerable. Russian officials feared that without control over the old Soviet borders their country would be easy prey for drug traffickers, terrorists, and others seeking to exploit Russia's weakness.

Tsar Peter the Great, champion of Russian expansion, orders Gorbachev and Yeltsin to be punished: "Beat them—100 lashes for the ones who ruined the Russian empire."

How has Russia's influence over other former Soviet Republics changed?

By the end of 1992, Russian leaders gradually tilted away from the West and shifted their focus to the other states of the FSU. A new term — "near abroad" — emerged to describe Russia's perspective on their former Soviet neighbors. Of particular concern were the many ethnic Russians who live in these neighboring lands.

Russia hoped to use the many policy levers at its disposal to carve out a sphere of influence in the near abroad. Most of the other former Soviet republics were dependent on Russia for energy, or at least for energy pipelines. Military, transportation, and communication links also created a common bond.

Russia, however, could not hide its fundamental weaknesses, especially from its neighbors. Economically, Russia has had little to offer in the way of investment and innovative technology. Like Russia itself, the rest of the FSU has been compelled to turn to the United States, Western Europe, and East Asia to fund economic development.

How has the Russian military changed since the end of the Soviet empire?

Russia's decline has been nowhere more evident than in the troubles of the Russian military. A force that once held together a huge empire is today in tatters. Defense spending (comparable to U.S. levels during the Cold War) has fallen roughly ten times to less than $20 billion annually. One-third of Russia's troops are malnourished. Only one in five is issued an overcoat. In many Russian cities, soldiers openly sell their weapons for extra cash. Even the Russian navy was compelled to sell two aircraft carriers to South Korea as scrap metal in 1996.

Russia's military crisis became clear during the Chechen rebellion in 1994. Before the fighting began, Russia's defense minister boasted that the uprising would be quashed in two hours. Instead, the first weeks of the war showed that the Russian army was poorly organized and unprepared.

In 1997, Yeltsin conceded the need for drastic reform. He ordered that troop strength be cut from 1.7 million men to 1.2 million over three years. He also announced plans to create a more mobile, highly professional army. Critics, however, were quick to note that Yeltsin's reforms could not be achieved without substantial increases in defense spending. President Putin has begun efforts to restructure the forces that maintain Russia's nuclear arsenal.

The downsizing of the military will force Rus-

sian leaders to rethink their foreign policy priorities. Since the Soviet collapse, Russian troops have continued to guard the borders in much of the FSU. In Tajikistan, for example, more than 16,000 Russian soldiers have been in place to protect the government there from rebels based in neighboring Afghanistan. Russian officials fear that turmoil in former Soviet states to the south will expose their own country to a flood of refugees and fuel the spread of radical Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims in Russia.

Part III: Challenges Facing the United States

For more than forty years, anxiety about the Soviet Union consumed the United States. In movies, books, and television programs, the Soviets were typically depicted as a global menace. From Central America to southern Africa to the Middle East to Southeast Asia, Washington was locked in a deadly chess match with Moscow. Looming over the confrontation was the possibility that the Cold War might ignite a catastrophic nuclear exchange.

American attitudes have changed dramatically since the Cold War years. Interest in the countries that made up the Soviet Union has slipped well down the national agenda. Russia is no longer seen as a grave threat to our country. Trade between the former Soviet countries and the United States is comparatively small, while instability and conflict tend to dominate news from the region.

At the same time, the end of the Cold War left behind many unresolved problems, and also created some new ones. Issues involving nuclear weapons and Russian ambitions abroad continue to command international attention. Meanwhile, Russia's entry into the global marketplace has opened fresh opportunities. In this part of the background reading, you will examine the leading issues in U.S.-Russian relations.

Nuclear Threats

Russia's nuclear arsenal is the only force on earth, other than our own nuclear weapons, capable of virtually destroying humanity. When the Soviet Union fell apart, Russia and its neighbors inherited about 27,000 nuclear warheads and the world's largest stockpile of nuclear bomb materials.

Nuclear arms fall into two categories. Tactical nuclear weapons consist of short-range missiles, artillery shells, and other armaments intended for battlefield use. Strategic nuclear weapons are long-range missiles and nuclear-equipped bombers capable of reaching the United States.

Tactical nuclear weapons had been widely dispersed in the Soviet Union, but by early 1992 the authorities in Moscow had concentrated all of them in Russia. The strategic nuclear missiles presented a different problem, since most of them could not be easily moved. Eighty-five percent of the missiles were based in Russia, but that still left sizeable forces in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus.

Following the Soviet collapse, significant progress was achieved in reversing the nuclear arms race. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus agreed to turn their nuclear arsenals over to Russia. In addition, U.S. and Russian leaders in 1993 signed a breakthrough treaty, START II, that called for unprecedented cuts in nuclear weapons stockpiles.

By 2003, the United States and Russia are scheduled to reduce their arsenals of strategic nuclear weapons by over two-thirds. Both sides will retain 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads — each capable of destroying a large city. However, the most destructive class of weapons — long-range missiles carrying several nuclear warheads — will be eliminated altogether.

How has Russia reacted to U.S. consideration of a missile defense system?

U.S. consideration of a missile defense system has concerned Russian officials and threatens progress on further arms control agreements. Moscow feels the proposed U.S. system would violate a 1972 treaty which has served as a cornerstone for nuclear arms control. The United States has proposed modifying the treaty but Russia has not agreed. President Putin has sought to drive a diplomatic wedge between the United States and the NATO members who oppose the proposed U.S. system.

Why are U.S. officials concerned about Russia's control of its nuclear weapons program?

Strategic nuclear weapons, however, no longer pose the chief concern among U.S. security officials. Rather, most of them fear that Russia's economic troubles have weakened Moscow's grip over its nuclear weapons program.

Russian nuclear materials are scattered throughout a vast web of military installations, weapons laboratories and assembly factories, research institutes, nuclear power plants, naval fuel depots, nuclear waste storage facilities, and other sites.

According to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates, Russia possesses 200 tons of plutonium and 1,200 tons of highly enriched uranium. Less than ten pounds of weapons-grade plutonium is needed to make a small nuclear bomb. An even smaller amount would be sufficient to poison the water supply of a large city and kill thousands of people.

Nuclear weapons experts fear that nuclear research centers and power plants are especially vulnerable to would-be smugglers of nuclear materials. Within Russia, criminal gangs are in the best position to gain access to nuclear materials and sell them on the international black market. A few pounds of plutonium could be worth millions of dollars.

It's possible to buy anything in our country, including [nuclear] weapons and samples.
—Igor Matveyenko, Russian physicist

So far, only a handful of nuclear smuggling cases have surfaced. In 1994, for example, Czech police seized nearly six pounds of highly enriched uranium smuggled from Russia — the largest quantity netted in a smuggling operation since the Soviet collapse.

Why are there concerns about Russia's nuclear reactors?

Closer to home for most Russians is the questionable safety of the twenty-nine nuclear reactors in their country. In 1986, the Soviet Union suffered the world's worst nuclear accident when an explosion destroyed a nuclear power plant at Chernobyl, Ukraine. The accident forced 130,000 people to evacuate their homes from an area slightly larger than Maryland.

U.S. policymakers have urged their counterparts throughout the former Soviet Union to shut down aging nuclear reactors. Nonetheless, Russian officials argue that their country cannot afford to switch to other energy sources. At the same time, they are pressing ahead with plans to build a new generation of reactors. Leaders of other former Soviet states with nuclear reactors — Armenia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, and Ukraine — share similar attitudes.

How has the United States helped Russia safeguard its nuclear weapons?

Since 1992, the United States has budgeted roughly $700 million a year to be spent on dismantling nuclear weapons and tightening security at nuclear facilities in the FSU. The United States has also reached an agreement that calls on Russia to sell American nuclear energy plants with highly enriched uranium diluted for use as fuel. In turn, Russia has agreed to stop producing plutonium.

Why is the United States concerned about Russia's nuclear scientists?

In addition to plugging leaks of nuclear materials, U.S. efforts have sought to stem the flow abroad of Russian nuclear scientists and technology. According to U.S. estimates, roughly 2,000 scientists in the

Chip Bok in the Akron Beacon Journal. Reprinted by permission Creators Syndicate.

FSU have the technical knowledge to make nuclear arms. Hundreds more are specialists in building long-range missiles that could be equipped with nuclear warheads.

Many of the scientists who were once elite members of the Soviet Union's nuclear program now work at private companies that offer their services to developing countries. Iran has been a leading customer.

U.S. officials claim that Iran has made use of Russian expertise in its push to develop missiles capable of striking targets throughout the Middle East. The United States has maintained steady pressure on the Russian government to cut Russia's ties with Iran. Russia agreed to halt arms sales to Iran and cooperate with the United States to prevent Iran from acquiring long-range missiles. However, Russia has rejected a U.S. request to suspend a Russian contract to construct nuclear power plants in Iran.

How does Russia's economy affect its ability to maintain its nuclear arsenal?

In the coming years, economic factors may have a greater impact on Russia's stature as a nuclear power than U.S. pressure. The next stage of nuclear arms cuts, outlined by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in 1997, calls for each side to reduce its nuclear arsenal to 2,000-2,500 warheads by 2007.

At the same time, nuclear weapons experts both inside and outside of Russia predict that budget constraints will compel Moscow to trim its nuclear arsenal to 1,000-1,500 warheads over the next decade. President Vladimir Putin has proposed restructuring of Russia's nuclear forces.

Why must Russia rely on nuclear weapons for its defense strategy?

Even after the reduction of nuclear warheads to lower levels, nuclear weapons occupy a more prominent place in Russia's defensive strategy than ever. With Russia's conventional army in crisis, Moscow has little choice but to rely on nuclear might to deter potential enemies.

National pride also figures into the Russian position. Russian politicians generally view nuclear weapons as a guarantee of their country's status as a great power. In the Russian legislature, arms control treaties have been looked on with suspicion. Many of the legislators believe that the United States wants to take advantage of their country's weakness to impose deep cuts in Russia's nuclear strength. For example, ratification by the Russian Duma of the START II agreement in 2000 was delayed for seven years and took place only at the urging of President Putin. (The agreement has not yet been submitted for ratification by the U.S. Senate.)

Russia on the World Stage

In addition to cooperation on nuclear issues, the end of the Cold War brought to a close the divisions that had defined international affairs since the end of World War II. As a result, Europe is no longer the heavily fortified front line of the Cold War. Internationally, Washington and Moscow often find themselves on the same side in efforts to combat terrorism or control drug trafficking.

How has Russia reacted to NATO expansion?

From the Russian perspective, however, many of the Cold War divisions remain. Most troubling for the Russians has been the continued role of NATO in European security. NATO was created by the United States and its Western European allies in 1949 to block Soviet aggression in Europe. When Soviet leaders allowed their allies to break away from the Soviet bloc in the late 1980s, they expected that NATO would in turn be scaled back.

NATO's troop strength and arms spending have indeed been trimmed, but the organization has expanded its membership. In 1997, at the urging of the Clinton administration, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were invited to join the military alliance. In addition, U.S. officials have suggested that a second round of expansion could take in other former Soviet bloc countries, such as the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

President Clinton presented NATO expansion as a vehicle for extending the security system that has contributed to Western Europe's peace and prosperity since World War II. He attempted to ease Russian

concerns by giving Moscow a voice in shaping European security issues.

Nonetheless, Russian leaders remain strongly opposed to the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO. Most see NATO as an alliance directed against their country. They have warned that bringing NATO forces closer to Russia's borders could revive military tension between Russia and the West. They have expressed still greater alarm about the prospect of further expansion, especially in the Baltics.

Why is Russia concerned about the "near abroad?"

Russia's influence has steadily waned since the end of the Cold War, even in countries that were once part of the Soviet Union. In at least two areas, Russia's decline has set the stage for heightened competition with the United States.

Ukraine has drawn increasing interest from U.S. policymakers in recent years. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. leaders advised their Ukrainian counterparts to maintain close ties with Moscow. As U.S.-Russian relations have soured, however, Washington has supported Ukrainian efforts to break free of Moscow's orbit. Ukraine is now the top recipient of U.S. aid in the FSU, set to receive $216 million in 2000.

More worrisome for Russia are ongoing military exercises involving Ukrainian and NATO forces. Many Russians see the exercises as an indication that Washington would back Ukraine militarily in a conflict with Russia. The flashpoint for such a confrontation could be Ukraine's Crimean peninsula, where Russians form almost 70 percent of the population.

What role does energy play in U.S. interests in the FSU?

Further to the east in the Caspian Sea Basin, Russia and the United States are engaged in a high-stakes contest over energy. The region's oil reserves are estimated to be surpassed only by those of the Persian Gulf and Siberia. U.S. oil companies have struck deals for exploiting the oil and natural gas fields of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. The American oil giant Chevron, for example, plans to invest $20 billion in Kazakhstan alone.

Why is Russia so important to international diplomacy?

Although Russia cannot claim the superpower status of the Soviet Union, it nonetheless ranks among the world's most influential nations. Russia's position as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the well-established contacts of Russian diplomats give Moscow a weighty voice on the world stage. In 1998, Russia become the eighth member of the exclusive club of wealthy, democratic nations known as the Group of Seven.

Russian officials clearly resent America's dominance of international affairs since the Soviet collapse. At the same time, they recognize their limitations in the foreign policy arena. As a result, their relationship with Washington on key international issues has alternated between cooperation and confrontation.

Why has policy toward Iraq been a source of disagreement?

Policy toward Iraq's Saddam Hussein has been a leading source of controversy. Since the United States led an international coalition to victory over Iraq in the Persian Gulf War in 1991, differences between Moscow and Washington have gradually widened. The United States has favored maintaining strict international sanctions against Saddam Hussein's regime and has demonstrated its will to enforce them with military might. In contrast, Russia wants to end Iraq's isolation. Moscow is especially eager to collect the roughly $10 billion in debt owed by Iraq and resume trading with a country that was once a staunch Soviet ally.

How did NATO action in Kosovo affect U.S.-Russian relations?

Relations between the United States and Russia hit a low point following NATO military action in Kosovo against Serbia in the spring of 1999. The war-torn Balkan region has been a point of contention between Russia and the United Sates since the mid-1990s. Russia historically has been a protector of the

regions Serbs who share the Orthodox Christian faith of Russia. In contrast, the United States has held Serb leaders in Yugoslavia and Bosnia primarily responsible for much of the region's violence. In spite of these differences, U.S. and Russian troops have worked successfully together in United Nations peacekeeping missions in Bosnia since 1995 and Kosovo since 1999.



Bill McNelly, Tribune Media Services

How has the United States used trade and aid to influence Russia?

Trade policy and economic aid have been the main tools by which the United States has tried to influence Russia's direction. In 1992, the goals of U.S. policy were well-matched with the Yeltsin government's ambitious program of free-market economic reform. Proposals for large-scale economic aid programs were put forward by American policy advisers. There was even talk of sponsoring the equivalent of a new Marshall Plan for Russia and its neighbors.

By 1993, the big-spending foreign aid proposals had faded. Russian reformers were left frustrated and disappointed by the lack of Western assistance. Many had staked their policies on the expectation that foreign aid would cushion the blow of economic change. As their influence within the Yeltsin government declined, Russian foreign policy began turning away from the West.

The Clinton administration soon gave up on hopes of helping guide Russia through a rapid transformation. Instead, the emphasis of U.S. policy shifted to keeping long-term Russian reform on track. U.S. officials worried that the rise of communists could steer Russia away from free market principles.

How much aid has the United States provided the FSU?

U.S. economic assistance to Russia peaked in 1994 at $1.6 billion. By 2000, $800 million in foreign aid was budgeted for the entire FSU, with roughly one quarter earmarked for Russia. Much of America's aid is target toward supporting newly privatized businesses in Russia.

Much more critical to Russia's economic direction has been America's role in the international financial institutions that have supported the Russian government. Since the Soviet collapse, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank had loaned Russia $25 billion. More than $10 billion of that sum was provided a few months before the 1996 presidential election and injected new life in the Yeltsin campaign. The United States has urged Western governments and banks to ease the repayment terms on Russia's $120 billion foreign debt.

Critics have question the wisdom of Western assistance to Russia. They charge that loans and aid have contributed to corruption, fueled the war in Chechnya, and allowed officials to delay enacting painful, but necessary, economic measures.

IMF officials have themselves lent credence to the criticisms. In late 1997, they suspended the IMF's loan program to Russia in response to Moscow's failure to crack down on tax evasion. According to the IMF's report, many of those with the largest unpaid bills enjoy close connections with the government.

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How have U.S. leaders encouraged Russia to enter the global economic system?

Since the Soviet collapse, U.S. leader have emphasized the need to firmly anchor Russia in the global economic system. To that end, they have encouraged the Russian government to lower trade barriers and to establish clear rules for foreign investment.

Russia's entry into the global marketplace, however, has been slow. Trade between the United States and Russia has been meager. In 1999, America imported $1.9 billion worth of goods from Russia and exported $5.8 billion— a tiny fraction of the nearly $2 trillion in U.S. trade for the year.

Moreover, Russia has yet to gain admission to the World Trade Organization, the international body that sets the ground rules for global trade. The United States has maintained that Russia must first take stronger measure to protect intellectual property rights that apply to music, computer software, and other creative products. U.S. trade negotiators have also urged Russia to remove obstacles that have blocked foreign investment in Russia's huge oil and natural gas sector.

In what areas has the United States objected to Russian involvement in the global marketplace?

In markets where Russian exports are in high demand, the United States has often raised foreign policy objections. In addition to protesting Russian contracts to build nuclear reactors in Iran, Washington has voiced concern about Russian arms sales. Russia, for example, is now China's main weapons supplier. Russia's biggest contract with China calls for the sale of two advanced naval destroyers for $8 billion.

Russian officials claim U.S. criticisms are designed to undercut competition from Russian defense manufacturers. In 1997, Russian arms exports topped $4 billion, second only to the United States.

Conclusion

In the coming days, you will have an opportunity to consider a range of alternative for U.S. policy toward Russia and is neighbors. Each of the four viewpoints, or options, that you will explore in the next part of this unit is based on a distinct set of values and beliefs. Each takes a different perspective on your country's role in the world and Russia's direction in the next decade. You should think of the options as a tool designed to help you better understand the contrasting strategies from which Americans must craft future policy.

At the end of this unit, you will be asked to create an option that reflects your own beliefs and opinions about where U.S. policy should be heading. You may borrow heavily from one option, or you may combine ideas from several options. Or you may take a new approach altogether. You will need to weigh the risks and trade-offs of whatever you decide. There are, of course, no perfect solutions.

Options in Brief

Option 1 — Guide Russia Forward

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian people have struggled to transform their society. There have been setbacks and disappointments, but Russia has also made substantial progress. Russia remains in a period of transition. At this critical juncture, Americans must not waver in our commitment to reform in Russia. We must reach out to bring Moscow into the international community. Along with our key allies in Western Europe and Japan, we should do what we can to keep Russia on track toward democracy and the free market. To enlist Russia's cooperation in solving common problems, we must make room for Moscow in the decision-making process.

Option 2 — Keep the Lid On

The collapse of the Soviet Union has unleashed a new set of problems for the United States and its allies. The mess in Russia and its neighbors is not of our making. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore it. The United States must work to ensure that the problems afflicting the region do not become our problems. Above all, we should not be rocking the boat by pushing half-baked reform schemes or meddling in the relations among the FSU countries. In coping with the instability in Russia, we should keep in mind our country's primary foreign policy interests. To meet our priorities, the United States should promote stability and order. The best we can do is to keep the lid on this vast, simmering country.

Option 3 — Declaw the Russian Bear

Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, much of the power of our Cold War enemy remains in the hands of Russia. Since 1992, the voices of authoritarianism and nationalism have grown stronger, both inside and outside of the Russian government. Russia is again showing its teeth, and turning away from the United States. Americans must recognize that the Cold War is not over. We must understand that our interests and the interests of Russia will inevitably conflict. Rather than helping Russia renew its economic and military competition with the United States, we should take steps to declaw the Russian bear.

Option 4 — Mind Our Own Business

For forty years, the Cold War not only dominated U.S. foreign policy, but also took precedence over vital concerns here at home. Now that the Cold War is over, it's time to put our national priorities back in order. Rather than searching for new entanglements overseas, the United States should strive to limit its involvement in the FSU. Recent events have made clear the foolishness of promoting experimental reform programs or sticking our nose into disputes between Russia and its neighbors. Let us turn our attention to revitalizing the United States.

Option 1

Guide Russia Forward

For forty years, the United States spent trillions of dollars on our country's confrontation with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, America's resolve paid off. Today, our country's commitment is again being tested. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian people have struggled to transform their society. There have been setbacks and disappointments, but Russia has also made substantial progress. Democracy has begun to sink roots in Russian society, while economic reform has established a solid foundation. On the world stage, Russia and the United States are not allies, but neither are they enemies. In short, Russia remains in a period of transition. To a large extent, the nature of international relations in the next century hinges on Russia's direction.

At this critical juncture, Americans must not waver in our commitment to reform in Russia. We must reach out to bring Moscow into the international community. Along with our key allies in Western Europe and Japan, we should do what we can to keep Russia on track toward democracy and the free market. Americans and Russians may not agree on every issue, but we can nonetheless work together to promote global peace and prosperity. On many fronts — controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, protecting the environment, and combating terrorism and drug trafficking — Russian participation is essential. To enlist Russia's cooperation in solving common problems, we must make room for Moscow in the decision-making process. We must recognize that Russia has a positive role to play in international affairs. After spending trillions of dollars on the Cold War, we would be foolish not to extend a hand of friendship to the new Russia. We have a historic opportunity to remake the world. Let's not miss it.

What policies should we pursue?

- The United States should lower barriers to trade with Russia and encourage American investment.

- The United States should support IMF loans to promote Russian economic reform and give Russia extra time to pay back its foreign debt.

- The United States should block further expansion of NATO in Central Europe.

- The United States should recommend that Russian peacekeeping operations in the FSU receive recognition from the United Nations.

- The United States should cooperate with Russia to control the spread of nuclear weapons and address Russian security concerns before developing new anti-missile defense systems.

- The United States should clear away obstacles to Russia's inclusion in important international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization.

Lessons from the Cold War

Thanks to the determination and farsightedness of U.S. leaders, a Western alliance capable of standing up to the Soviet Union was forged in the late 1940s. After World War II, the United States helped lay the foundation for stable free-market democracy in Western Europe. Our country's aid and diplomatic involvement transformed friend and foe alike. In the case of West Germany, Marshall Plan assistance extinguished support for Nazism and united Germans with our traditional allies in Western Europe. Regrettably, the same approach was not applied after World War I. Without U.S. help, Germany experienced poverty and chaos in the 1920s. These desperate conditions gave rise to Adolf Hitler.

Option 1 is based on the following beliefs

- The relationship between the United States and Russia has the potential to develop into a close alliance.
- U.S. assistance and support can play a major role in guiding Russia toward democratic, free-market reform.
- Russia's direction will have a very significant impact on the course of international relations in the 21st century.

PROS

SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. Helping Russia establish democracy and free-market prosperity will strengthen the cause of reform throughout the world, especially in the other countries of the FSU.
2. Prosperity in Russia will open a huge new market for U.S. trade and investment, thus spurring economic growth here at home.

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3. Accepting Russia as a partner of the West will ensure that Russia is on our side in future international disputes.

CONS

OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. Continuing our support for Russia will serve to reward Russian officials who have enriched themselves through corruption and worked against U.S. interests in the international arena.
2. The revival of Russia's economy will inevitably be turned against us, as hard-line forces seek to restore their country's international influence at the expense of the United States.
3. Putting our chips on the current Russian government is not only a foolish bet, but could harm our relations with future leaders in Russia.
4. At a time when American workers face heightened pressure from global competition, the United States should hardly be channeling American investment or trade benefits to Russia.

Option 2

Keep the Lid On

The collapse of the Soviet Union has unleashed a new set of problems for the United States and its allies. The huge nuclear program built during the Soviet era is in tatters, leaving huge stockpiles of weapons and other nuclear materials up for grabs. The next political crisis in Russia may put the nuclear button in the hands of anti-Western extremists or open new routes for the Russian Mafia to engage in nuclear smuggling. Meanwhile, war and poverty have created thousands of refugees in the FSU, and millions more could be on the move if conditions worsen. The mess in Russia and its neighbors is not of our making. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore it. The United States must work to ensure that the problems afflicting the region do not become our problems. Above all, we should not be rocking the boat by pushing half-baked reform schemes or meddling in the relations between Russia and its neighbors.

In coping with instability in Russia, we should keep in mind our country's primary foreign policy interests. Needless to say, we would like to see democracy, human rights, and free-market economic systems flourish. But U.S. policy cannot be guided by far-fetched dreams. We cannot reshape the world in our image. We cannot expect to make Russia our partner in international affairs. Normal, business-like relations are the best we can hope for. In the meantime, we should concentrate on responding to specific threats. Most important is making sure that Russia's military force and nuclear arsenal do not endanger world peace. Control over nuclear materials is essential. In addition, we must prevent ethnic conflicts and refugee crises from spilling over the borders of the FSU into Europe and the Middle East. To meet our priorities, the United States should promote stability and order. No one can predict the outcome of Russia's transition. For the moment, the best we can do is to keep the lid on this vast, simmering country.

What policies should we pursue?

- The United States should offer trade benefits to Russia in exchange for Russian progress in dismantling its nuclear arsenal.
- The United States should support limited IMF loans to prevent an economic crisis in Russia.
- The United States should proceed cautiously, but steadily, with the expansion of NATO into Central Europe.
- The United States should maintain a balanced policy toward disputes between Russia and its neighbors.
- The United States should focus U.S. aid on strengthening the security of sites in Russia where nuclear materials are stored and press Moscow to allow U.S. specialists to inspect its nuclear facilities.
- The United States should reward responsible Russian behavior in the international arena by encouraging Russian participation in important international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization.

Lessons from the Cold War

U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War was most effective when it focused squarely on protecting U.S. interests. The creation of NATO, for example, clearly communicated our country's intention to defend Western Europe from Soviet aggression. For more than four decades, the alliance kept the peace in a region of vital U.S. interest. Our country's greatest mistakes during the Cold War resulted when we overstepped our national interests and failed to recognize our limits. U.S. involvement in Vietnam, for example, extended well beyond the scope of our country's original Cold War strategy.

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Option 2 is based on the following beliefs

- Russia's nuclear arsenal, enormous military, and corrupt political system pose a serious threat to international stability.
- Russia is unlikely to become an ally of the United States, regardless of what policies our country pursues.
- U.S. efforts to promote American values in Russia will cause more harm than good.

PROS

SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. Taking a balanced approach toward disputes within the FSU will promote stable, peaceful relations between Russia and its neighbors.
2. Speeding up the dismantling of Russia's nuclear weapons and the downsizing of its defense industry will allow other countries in Europe and Asia to cut military spending as well.

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3. Shifting our efforts in Russia toward promoting stability, rather than pushing reform, will reduce anti-American feelings among the Russian people.

CONS

OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. Giving up on Russia's transition now will kill momentum toward democratic and free-market reform throughout the region.
2. Allowing Russia to drift aimlessly in the international arena will undermine efforts to promote global peace and cooperation.
3. Pressing the non-Russian states of the FSU to accept Russia's leadership on security issues will turn them against the United States and fan tensions between Russia and its neighbors.
4. Focusing U.S. concern on the FSU will distract us from dealing with social problems here at home and restoring the health of the American economy.

Option 3

DECLAW THE RUSSIAN BEAR

Although the Soviet Union no longer exists, much of the power of our Cold War enemy remains in the hands of Russia. With three-quarters of the Soviet Union's territory, Russia is the biggest country in the world. Its vast reserves of raw materials are matched by no other nation. Furthermore, Russia continues to maintain a huge army and a nuclear arsenal only slightly less advanced than our own. Russia's present leaders are determined to restore their country's stature in world affairs. Following the Soviet collapse, many foreign policy specialists naively believed that Russia would join us in embracing democracy and free-market economics. Their initial optimism, however, soon dimmed. Since 1992, the voices of authoritarianism and nationalism have grown stronger, both inside and outside of the Russian government. Russia is again showing its teeth, and turning away from the United States.

Americans must understand that our interests and the interests of Russia will inevitably conflict. Despite the current lull in hostilities, a resurgent Russia will sooner or later threaten U.S. security. The United States and Russia will again be battling for influence in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. The simple fact is that a strong Russia should not be welcomed by the United States. Rather than helping Russia renew its economic and military competition with the United States, we should take steps to declaw the Russian bear. Limiting Russia's military power, especially its nuclear forces, should be our primary goal. We should also help the non-Russian states of the FSU resist Moscow's efforts to restore the Soviet empire. The collapse of the Soviet Union has given us a head start in preparing for the next round of the Cold War. Let us not squander our lead.

What policies should we pursue?

- The United States should provide aid to Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and other FSU countries seeking to break the domination of Russia.
- The United States should promote American investment in the development of the Caspian Sea Basin's energy resources and block Russian efforts to control the region.
- The United States should oppose further IMF loans to Russia.
- The United States should press forward quickly with the expansion of NATO into Central Europe.
- The United States should apply trade sanctions to punish Russia for doing business with Iran, Iraq, and other outlaw states.
- The United States should block Russian membership in international organizations until Moscow halts efforts to frustrate American interests.

Lessons from the Cold War

The Cold War went much deeper than the conflict between communism and free-market democracy. Rather, the struggle was rooted in the conflicting national interests of the United States and Russia. Geography divided our two countries from the outset. Protected on two sides by great oceans, U.S. leaders approached the issue of security with a very different perspective from that of their nearly landlocked counterparts in Moscow. The contrasting national characters of the two peoples also help to explain the hostility of the Cold War. Our country's free-market economic system is a reflection of American values, while Soviet communism grew out of Russian traditions. Obviously, these divisions have not disappeared with the end of the Cold War.

Option 3 is based on the following beliefs

- The policy disagreements between the United States and Russia are deeply rooted in geography and culture.
- Once Russia overcomes its current economic problems, Moscow will again pursue an aggressive foreign policy.
- Russia has the potential to restore its status as a global superpower.

PROS SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. Limiting Russia's military power will reduce the security fears of Russia's neighbors, as well as those of our allies in Western Europe and East Asia, and contribute to international peace and stability.

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2. Firmly defending the independence of Russia's neighbors in the FSU will open new economic opportunities for American businesses in the Caspian Sea Basin, Ukraine, and elsewhere in the region.

3. Offering firm security guarantees to Russia's neighbors will make it clear that Russia will pay dearly for any attempt to restore its empire by force.

CONS OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. Taking a hostile stance toward Russia will bring progress on nuclear arms control to a halt, close the door on Russian cooperation to control international nuclear smuggling, and increase international tensions to dangerous levels.

2. Supporting the non-Russian states of the FSU at Russia's expense will turn the world's largest country into a bitter enemy of the United States, and fuel hostility between Russia and its neighbors.

3. Defining Russia as our enemy will doom democratic, free-market reforms and lend support to the cause of communists and nationalists seeking to gain power.

4. Encouraging the non-Russian countries of the FSU to distance themselves from Russia will further weaken trade links among the FSU countries and worsen economic conditions for all.

Option 4

Mind Our Own Business

For forty years, the Cold War not only dominated U.S. foreign policy, but also took precedence over vital concerns here at home. The United States poured hundreds of billions of dollars into military research while our schools crumbled. More than half a million U.S. troops were stationed overseas while crime, homelessness, and the budget deficit increased in our country. Now that the Cold War is over, it's time to put our national priorities back in order. Undeniably, the problems facing Russia are severe. However, the country is much too large and complex for the United States to significantly influence its direction. Ultimately, the future of Russia and its neighbors will be decided by the people of the region. The Russians understand their problems and limitations well. There may be frustration and disappointment, but few Russians suggest that their country should reignite the Cold War with the United States. Despite the exaggerated warnings of alarmists in the United States, Russia is not a threat to our security.

Rather than searching for new entanglements overseas, the United States should strive to limit its involvement in the FSU. Recent events have made clear the foolishness of promoting experimental reform programs or sticking our nose into disputes between Russia and its neighbors. Historic challenges await the United States as we struggle to reduce poverty and crime, strengthen our educational system, and tackle other long neglected problems. We cannot allow our concentration to be distracted by another foreign policy crusade. We have done our part to make the world a better place. Now let us turn our attention to revitalizing the United States.

What policies should we pursue?

- The United States should provide only humanitarian relief aid to the FSU.
- The United States should press Russia to lower its trade barriers in exchange for greater access to the American market.
- The United States should cancel plans to expand NATO and scale back the U.S. military presence in Europe.
- The United States should continue to respect current nuclear arms control agreements with Russia.
- The United States should maintain a neutral position toward disputes between Russia and its neighbors.
- The United States should work with Russia through the United Nations to control the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear smuggl[illegible]

Lessons from the Cold War

The collapse of the Soviet Union should serve as a warning to Americans. The Soviets were stretched thin by their overseas commitments and the burden of their enormous military. Ultimately, the demands of Soviet foreign policy overwhelmed the capacity of the society. The United States was fortunate to outlast the Soviet Union. However, we have suffered from the same exaggerated emphasis on foreign policy that brought down the Soviet empire. The Cold War put both superpowers on the path to self-destruction. Unless we change, we may only a few steps behind our former enemies.

Option 4 is based on the following beliefs

- Russia's importance in world affairs has faded since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
- U.S. efforts to influence the direction of Russia's transition have little impact.
- With the end of the Cold War, there is no longer a good reason to invest much of our country's resources in pursuing foreign policy goals.

PROS

SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. By not taking sides in Russian politics, the United States will avoid becoming a target for blame among Russians opposed to economic reform.
2. Allowing other countries to take the lead in addressing Russia's problems will enable us to reduce the costs of conducting U.S. foreign policy.

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3. Continued foreign aid to Russia will likely fall into the hands of hard-line officials and corrupt bureaucrats, thus strengthening the forces opposed to reform.

CONS

OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. By turning our back on reformers in Russia, the United States will lose its position of leadership in promoting democracy and the free-market economic system around the world.
2. By not participating in aid programs now, the United States will find itself cut out of future opportunities for trade and investment in Russia.
3. Saving a few dollars today on aid to the FSU will seem short-sighted tomorrow if we must spend tens of billions more to defend ourselves from a hostile Russia.
4. Burying our heads in the sand as Russia recovers its military strength and restores its empire will leave the United States to confront a much more powerful foe in the future.

Optional Reading: American Society from the Soviet Perspective

Introduction: Soviet films, newspapers, and textbooks typically painted a grim image of the United States. Our country was depicted as a society dominated by inequality, racism, poverty, and violence. Since the end of the Cold War, Moscow's official attitude toward the United States has changed dramatically. Nonetheless, most Russians alive today formed their initial impressions of the United States from Soviet propaganda. In many Russian schools, textbooks from the Soviet era continue to be used because of funding shortages.

Below is a short story about American society excerpted from a Soviet textbook. As you read the story, entitled *The Red Shoes*, consider the image of American society presented by the author.

The Red Shoes*

The dark-skinned little girl Nancy lived with her mother in an American city. Nancy's mother worked as a dishwasher in a restaurant and got home after midnight. But no matter how late her mother got home, Nancy always waited and did not go to bed without her.

Nancy's shoes had worn out. They were so worn out that even their neighbor, the shoemaker Bill, couldn't do anything to fix them. The sole of the left shoe was entirely worn off, and the right one had such a gaping hole that one could see the toes of Nancy's foot.

In the morning, looking over what remained of her shoes, Nancy started to cry. "How am I going to go walking without shoes?" Her mother sighed heavily. "I will stay at work until morning. Then, perhaps, I can manage to save enough money to buy you a new pair of shoes."

Until morning? Did that mean Nancy would be alone all night? But the desire to have new shoes was so strong that Nancy didn't pay any attention.

"Mama, buy me red shoes, you know, like the ones the little girl had that we saw in the park," she begged her mother. Her mother sighed once again. "I don't know, my little girl, if I'll be able to earn enough." However, Nancy so plaintively begged her mother to buy her the red shoes, without fail, that her mother at last promised.

On Nancy's mother's day off, they set out together for the shoestore. In the shining plate-glass window of the store stood boots and shoes of all colors. Nancy was dazzled: she had never seen such elegant shoes. Suddenly she cried out, "Mama, Mama, look: there they are — the red shoes! Let's go quickly, Mama, and buy them!"

They went into the store. One salesman was trying a pair of yellow shoes on a fair-haired, snub-nosed little boy; the other salesman nonchalantly chattered away. The tall proprietor by the desk didn't even look over at the Negress [black woman] with the little girl.

Nancy and her mother stood a long time by the counter. At last Nancy's mother timidly requested, "Forgive me, please, wouldn't you be so kind as to show us a pair of red shoes for my little girl?"

One of the salesmen reluctantly came over to them.

"These are expensive goods," he said. "Do you have enough money for such shoes?"

The mother showed her purse. "There, sir, all last week I worked nights." Only then the salesman laid out on the counter a pair of red shoes. They were so soft, shone so nicely, and smelled so of new leather that Nancy started clapping her hands.

The salesman growled, "You can try them on if you want."

He himself was supposed to try shoes on the customers, but he wouldn't dream of stooping for

*From *An American in Leningrad*, by Logan Robinson (New York: Norton, 1984)

these black customers. The mother herself knelt down in front of Nancy and began to pull the shoes on her. But what a pity, they were too small.

"I wonder if you might, sir, have a little bigger pair?" requested Nancy's mother.

The salesman sullenly looked over at her. "A little larger? I have them. Only you have to take the pair you tried on."

Nancy's mother rose from her knees.

"Take this pair?" she asked again. "But really, these shoes are too tight for the little girl."

The salesman quietly wrapped up the shoes in paper. "And who would want to take these shoes, which were put on your black feet? You have to take these shoes from us."

Nancy's mother clasped her hands. "My God, really, all I have is enough for one pair. Does this mean my little girl must remain without shoes?"

Hearing this, Nancy loudly started to cry. Her mother approached the proprietor of the store.

"Sir," she appealed to him. "I implore you, sir, don't make me buy these shoes....I don't have a spare cent, sir...."

"I don't want to incur a loss because of you," muttered the proprietor. "You should have known that after your little girl tried them on, not one American would buy these shoes for his children."

"You're wrong about that, proprietor," a loud, friendly voice suddenly resounded.

A customer in blue work overalls walked up to the counter and patted Nancy on the back.

"You don't have to cry, little girl," he said. "Although the shoes you tried on were expensive, I'll take them anyway; they are perfectly suitable for my little girl. And you yourself purchase other ones. I know well the meaning of hard-earned money."

He pulled out of his pocket enough money, paid the salesman, and took up the package with the shoes. Then he bowed to Nancy's mother and walked out of the store.

Successfully and happily, Nancy and her mother returned home that day. The dark-skinned little girl rejoiced at her new red shoes, which squeaked quietly with each of her steps.

[Below are the questions accompanying the short story]

1. What country does Nancy live in?
2. Why was it difficult for Nancy's mother to buy shoes for her daughter?
3. How did Nancy and her mother buy the shoes? Tell the story.
4. Who helped the dark-skinned customers? Read the story.
5. Explain the expression "hard-earned money."

Supplementary Documents

The Sources of Soviet Conduct
By "X"

(The article below, authored by George F. Kennan, is based on the 1946 memorandum in which Kennan proposed that the United States aim to contain the expansion of Soviet communism. The article appeared in Foreign Affairs *in July 1947.)*

The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct. Yet the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.

It is difficult to summarize the set of ideological concepts with which the Soviet leaders came into power. Marxian ideology, in its Russian-Communist projection, has always been in process of subtle evolution. The materials on which it bases itself are extensive and complex. But the outstanding features of Communist thought as it existed in 1916 may perhaps be summarized as follows: (a) that the central factor in the life of man, the factor which determines the character of public life and the "physiognomy of society," is the system by which material goods are produced and exchanged; (b) that the capitalist system of production is a nefarious one which inevitably leads to the exploitation of the working class by the capital-owning class and is incapable of developing adequately the economic resources of society or of distributing fairly the material goods produced by human labor; (c) that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction and must, in view of the inability of the capital-owning class to adjust itself to economic change, result eventually and inescapably in a revolutionary transfer of power to the working class; and (d) that imperialism, the final phase of capitalism, leads directly to war and revolution.

The rest may be outlined in Lenin's own words: "Unevenness of economic and political development is the inflexible law of capitalism. It follows from this that the victory of Socialism may come originally in a few capitalist countries or even in a single capitalist country. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and having organized Socialist production at home, would rise against the remaining capitalist world, drawing to itself in the process the oppressed classes of other countries."[1] It must be noted that there was no assumption that capitalism would perish without proletarian revolution. A final push was needed from a revolutionary proletariat movement in order to tip over the tottering structure. But it was regarded as inevitable that sooner or later that push would be given.

For 50 years prior to the outbreak of the Revolution, this pattern of thought had exercised great fascination for the members of the Russian revolutionary movement. Frustrated, discontented, hopeless of finding self-expression — or too impatient to seek it — in the confining limits of the Tsarist political system, yet lacking wide popular support for their choice of bloody revolution as a means of social betterment, these revolutionists found in Marxist theory a highly convenient rationalization for their own instinctive desires. It afforded pseudo-scientific justification for their impatience, for their categoric denial of all value in the Tsarist system, for their yearning for power and revenge and for their inclination to cut corners in the pursuit of it. It is therefore no wonder that they had come to believe implicitly in the truth and soundness of the Marxian-Leninist teachings, so congenial to their own impulses and emotions. Their sincerity need not be impugned. This is a phenomenon as old as human nature itself. It has never been more aptly described than by Edward Gibbon, who wrote in *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire:* "From enthusiasm to imposture the step is perilous and slippery; the demon of Socrates affords a memorable instance how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man may deceive others, how the conscious may slumber in a mixed and middle state between self-illusion and voluntary fraud." And it was with this set of conceptions

that the members of the Bolshevik Party entered into power.

Now it must be noted that through all the years of preparation for revolution, the attention of these men, as indeed for Marx himself, had been centered less on the future form which Socialism would take than on the necessary overthrow of rival power which, in their view, had to precede the introduction of Socialism. Their views, therefore, on the positive program to be put into effect, once power was attained, were for the most part nebulous, visionary and impractical. Beyond the nationalization of industry and the expropriation of large, private capital holdings, there was no agreed program. The treatment of the peasantry, which according to the Marxist formulation was not of the proletariat, had always been a vague spot in the pattern of Communist thought; and it remained an object of controversy and vacillation for the first ten years of Communist power.

The circumstances of the immediate post-revolution period — the existence in Russia of civil war and foreign intervention, together with the obvious facts that the Communists represented only a tiny minority of the Russian people — made the establishment of dictatorial power a necessity. The experiment with "war Communism" and the abrupt attempt to eliminate private production and trade had unfortunate economic consequences and caused further bitterness against the new revolutionary regime. While the temporary relaxation of the effort to communize Russia, represented by the New Economic Policy, alleviated some of this economic distress and thereby served its purpose, it also made it evident that the "capitalistic sector of society" was still prepared to profit at once from any relaxation of governmental pressure, and would, if permitted to continue to exist, always constitute a powerful opposing element to the Soviet regime and a serious rival for influence in the country. Somewhat the same situation prevailed with respect to the individual peasant who, in his own small way, was also a private producer.

Lenin, had he lived, might have proved a great enough man to reconcile these conflicting forces to the ultimate benefit of Russian society, though this is questionable. But be that as it may, Stalin, and those whom he led in the struggle for succession to Lenin's position of leadership, were not the men to tolerate rival political forces in the sphere of power which they coveted. Their sense of insecurity was too great. Their particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their own doctrinaire "rightness," they insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power. Outside of the Communist Party, Russian society was to have no rigidity. There were to be no forms of collective human activity or association which would not be dominated by the Party. No other force in Russian society was to be permitted to achieve vitality or integrity. Only the Party was to have structure. All else was to be an amorphous mass.

And within the Party the same principle was to apply. The mass of Party members might go through the motions of election, deliberation, decision and action; but in these motions they were to be animated not by their own individual wills but by the awesome breath of the Party leadership and the overbrooding presence of "the word."

Let it be stressed again that subjectively these men probably did not seek absolutism for its own sake. They doubtless believed — and found it easy to believe — that they alone knew what was good for society and that they would accomplish that good once their power was secure and unchallengeable. But in seeking that security of their own rule they were prepared to recognize no restrictions, either of God or man, on the character of their methods. And until such time as that security might be achieved, they placed far down on their scale of operational priorities the comforts and happiness of the peoples entrusted to their care.

Now the outstanding circumstance concerning the Soviet regime is that down to the present day this process of political consolidation has never been completed and the men in the Kremlin have continued to be predominantly absorbed with the struggle to secure and make absolute the power which they seized in November 1917. They have endeavored to secure it primarily against forces at home, within Soviet society itself. But they have also endeavored to secure it against the outside world. For ideology, as we have seen, taught them that the outside world was hostile and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the

political forces beyond their borders. The powerful hands of Russian history and tradition reached up to sustain them in this feeling. Finally, their own aggressive intransigence with respect to the outside world began to find its own reaction; and they were soon forced, to use another Gibbonesque phrase, "to chastise the contumacy" which they themselves had provoked. It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right.

Now it lies in the nature of the mental world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the character of their ideology, that no opposition to them can be officially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces of dying capitalism. As long as remnants of capitalism were officially recognized as existing in Russia, it was possible to place on them, as an internal element, part of the blame for the maintenance of a dictatorial form of society. But as these remnants were liquidated, little by little, this justification fell away; and when it was indicated officially that they had been finally destroyed, it disappeared altogether. And this fact created one of the most basic of the compulsions which came to act upon the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that there could be serious or widespread opposition to the Kremlin springing spontaneously from the liberated masses under its authority, it became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad.

This began at an early date. In 1924 Stalin specifically defended the retention of the "organs of suppression," meaning, among others, the army and the secret police, on the ground that "as long as there is a capitalist encirclement there will be danger of intervention with all the consequences that flow from that danger." In accordance with that theory, and from that time on, all internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power.

By the same token, tremendous emphasis has been placed on the original Communist thesis of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds. It is clear, from many indications, that this emphasis is not founded in reality. The real facts concerning it have been confused by the existence abroad of genuine resentment provoked by Soviet philosophy and tactics and occasionally by the existence of great centers of military power, notably the Nazi regime in Germany and the Japanese Government of the late 1930's, which did indeed have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union. But there is ample evidence that the stress laid in Moscow on the menace confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home.

Now the maintenance of this pattern of Soviet power, namely, the pursuit of unlimited authority domestically, accompanied by the cultivation of the semi-myth of implacable foreign hostility, has gone far to shape the actual machinery of Soviet power as we know it today. Internal organs of administration which did not serve this purpose withered on the vine. Organs which did serve this purpose became vastly swollen. The security of Soviet power came to rest on the iron discipline of the Party, on the severity and ubiquity of the secret police, and on the uncompromising economic monopolism of the state. The "organs of suppression," in which the Soviet leaders had sought security from rival forces, became in large measure the master of those whom they were designed to serve. Today the major part of the structure of Soviet power is committed to the perfection of the dictatorship and to the maintenance of the concept of Russia as in a state of siege, with the enemy lowering beyond the walls. And the millions of human beings who form that part of the structure of power must defend at all costs this concept of Russia's position, for without it, they are themselves superfluous.

As things stand today, the rulers can no longer dream of parting with these organs of suppression. The quest for absolute power, pursued now for nearly three decades with a ruthlessness unparalleled (in scope at least) in modern times, has again produced internally, as it did externally, its own reaction. The excesses of the police apparatus have fanned the potential opposition to the regime into something far greater and more dangerous than it could have been before those excesses began.

But least of all can the rulers dispense with the fiction by which the maintenance of dictatorial power

has been defended. For this fiction has been canonized in Soviet philosophy by the excesses already committed in its name; and it is now anchored in the Soviet structure of thought by bonds far greater than those of mere ideology.

II

So much for the historical background. What does it spell in terms of the political personality of Soviet power as we know it today?

Of the original ideology, nothing has been officially junked. Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself: to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it.

The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications for Russia's conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet Government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical manoeuvre permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of *caveat emptor*. Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable future. There can be variations of degree and of emphasis. When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that "the Russians have changed," and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such "changes." But we should not be misled by tactical manoeuvres. These characteristics of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed.

This means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it. The forces of progress can take their time in preparing for the final *coup de grace*. Meanwhile, what is vital is that the "Socialist fatherland" — that oasis of power which has been already won for Socialism in the person of the Soviet Union — should be cherished and defended by all good Communists at home and abroad, its fortunes promoted, its enemies badgered and confounded. The promotion of premature, "adventuristic" revolutionary projects abroad which might embarrass Soviet power in any way would be an inexcusable, even a counter-revolutionary act. The cause of Socialism is the support and promotion of Soviet power, as defined in Moscow.

This brings us to the second of the concepts important to contemporary Soviet outlook. That is the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept of power, which permits no focal points of organization outside the Party itself, requires that the Party leadership remain in theory the sole repository of truth. For if truth were to be found elsewhere, there would be justification for its expression in organized activity. But it is precisely that which the Kremlin cannot and will not permit.

The leadership of the Communist Party is therefore always right, and has been always right ever since in 1929 Stalin formalized his personal power by announcing that decisions of the Politburo were being taken unanimously.

On the principle of infallibility there rests the iron discipline of the Communist Party. In fact, the two

concepts are mutually self-supporting. Perfect discipline requires recognition of infallibility. Infallibility requires the observance of discipline. And the two together go far to determine the behaviorism of the entire Soviet apparatus of power. But their effect cannot be understood unless a third factor be taken into account, namely, the fact that the leadership is at liberty to put forward for tactical purposes any particular thesis which it finds useful to the cause at any particular moment and to require the faithful and unquestioning acceptance of that thesis by the members of the movement as a whole. This means that truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. It may vary from week to week, from month to month. It is nothing absolute and immutable — nothing which flows from objective reality. It is only the most recent manifestation of the wisdom of those in whom the ultimate wisdom is supposed to reside, because they represent the logic of history. The accumulative effect of these factors is to give to the whole subordinate apparatus of Soviet power an unshakable stubbornness and steadfastness in its orientation. This orientation can be changed at will by the Kremlin but by no other power. Once a given party line has been laid down on a given issue of current policy, the whole Soviet governmental machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force. The individuals who are the components of this machine are not amenable to arguments or reason which comes to them from outside sources. Their whole training has taught them to mistrust and discount the glib persuasiveness of the outside world. Like the white dog before the phonograph, they hear only the "master's voice." And if they are to be called off from the purposes last dictated to them, it is the master who must call them off. Thus the foreign representative cannot hope that his words will make any impression on them. The most that he can hope is that they will be transmitted to those at the top, who are capable of changing the party line. But even those are not likely to be swayed by any normal logic in the words of the bourgeois representative. Since there can be no appeal to common purposes, there can be no appeal to common mental approaches. For this reason, facts speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight when they have the ring of reflecting, or being backed up by, facts of unchallengeable validity.

But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility, and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of a superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.

These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia's adversaries — policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and

resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to the considerations of prestige. Like most any other government , it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons, it is a *sine qua non* of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russia prestige.

III

In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the world community.

But if ideology convinces the rulers of Russia that truth is on their side and that they can therefore afford to wait, those of us on whom that ideology has no claim are free to examine objectively the validity of that premise. The Soviet thesis not only implies complete lack of control by the west over its own economic destiny, it likewise assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this apocalyptic vision down to earth, and suppose that the western world finds the strength and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years. What does that spell for Russia itself?

The Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern technique to the arts of despotism, have solved the question of obedience within the confines of their power. Few challenge their authority; and even those who do are unable to make that challenge valid as against the organs of suppression of the state.

The Kremlin has also proved able to accomplish its purpose of building up in Russia, regardless of the interests of the inhabitants, an industrial foundation of heavy metallurgy, which is, to be sure, not yet complete but which is nevertheless continuing to grow and is approaching those of the other major industrial countries. All of this, however, both the maintenance of internal political security and the building of heavy industry, has been carried out at a terrible cost in human life and in human hopes and energies. It has necessitated the use of forced labor on a scale unprecedented in modern times under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect or abuse of other phases of Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumers' goods production, housing and transportation.

To all that, the war has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is physically and spiritually tired. The mass of people are disillusioned, skeptical and no longer as accessible as they once were to the magical attraction which Soviet power still radiates to its followers abroad. The avidity with which the people seized upon the slight respite accorded to the Church for tactical reasons during the war was eloquent testimony to the fact that their capacity for faith and devotion found little expression in the purposes of the regime.

In these circumstances, there are limits to the physical and nervous strength of people themselves. These limits are absolute ones, and are binding even for the cruelest dictatorship, because beyond them people cannot be driven. The forced labor camps and the other agencies of constraint provide temporary means of compelling people to work longer hours than

their own volition or mere economic pressure would dictate; but if people survive them at all they become old before their time and must be considered as human casualties to the demands of dictatorship. In either case their best powers are no longer available to society and can no longer be enlisted in the service of the state.

Here only the younger generation can help. The younger generation, despite all vicissitudes and sufferings, is numerous and vigorous; and the Russians are a talented people. But it still remains to be seen what will be the effects on mature performance of the abnormal emotional strains of childhood which Soviet dictatorship created and which were enormously increased by the war. Such things as normal security and placidity of home environment have practically ceased to exist in the Soviet Union outside of the most remote farms and villages. And observers are not yet sure whether that is not going to leave its mark on the overall capacity of the generation now coming into maturity.

In addition to this, we have the fact that Soviet economic development, while it can list certain formidable achievements, has been precariously spotty and uneven. Russia Communists who speak of the "uneven development of capitalism" should blush at the contemplation of their own national economy. Here certain branches of economic life, such as the metallurgical and machine industries, have been pushed out of all proportion to other sectors of the economy. Here is a nation striving to become in a short period of time one of the great industrialized nations of the world while it still has no highway network worthy of the name and only a relatively primitive network of railways. Much has been done to increase efficiency of labor and to teach primitive peasants something about the operation of machines. But maintenance is still a crying deficiency of all Soviet economy. Construction is hasty and poor in quality. Depreciation must be enormous. And in vast sectors of economic life it has not yet been possible to instill into labor anything like that general culture of production and technical self-respect which characterizes the skilled workers of the west.

It is difficult to see how these deficiencies can be corrected at an early date by a tired and dispirited population working largely under the shadow of fear and compulsion. And as long as they are not overcome, Russia will remain economically a vulnerable, and in a certain sense an impotent, nation, capable of exporting its enthusiasms and radiating the strange charm of its primitive political vitality but unable to back up those articles of export by the real evidences of material power and prosperity.

Meanwhile, a great uncertainty hangs over the political life of the Soviet Union. That is the uncertainty involved in the transfer of power from one individual or groups of individuals to others.

This is, of course, outstandingly the problem of the personal position of Stalin. We must remember that his succession to Lenin's preeminence in the Communist movement was the only such transfer of individual authority which the Soviet Union has experienced. That transfer took 12 years to consolidate. It cost the lives of millions of people and shook the state to its foundations. The attendant tremors were felt all through the international revolutionary movement, to the disadvantage of the Kremlin itself.

It is always possible that another transfer of preeminent power may take place quietly and inconspicuously, with no repercussions anywhere. But again; it is possible that the questions involved may unleash, to use some of Lenin's words, one of those "incredibly swift transitions" from "delicate deceit" to "wild violence" which characterize Russian history, and may shake Soviet power to its foundations.

But this is not only a question of Stalin himself. There has been, since 1938, a dangerous congealment of political life in the higher circles of Soviet power. The All-Union Congress of Soviets, in theory the supreme body of the Party, is supposed to meet not less often than once in three years. It will soon be eight full years since its last meeting. During this period membership in the Party has numerically doubled. Party mortality during the war was enormous; and today well over half of the Party members are persons who have entered since the last Party congress was held. Meanwhile, the same small group of men has carried on at the top through an amazing series of national vicissitudes. Surely there is some reason why the experiences of the war brought basic political changes to every one of the great governments of the west. Surely the causes of that phenomenon are basic enough to be present somewhere in the obscurity of Soviet political life, as well. And yet no recognition has been given to these causes in Russia.

It must be surmised from this that even within so

highly disciplined an organization as the Communist Party there must be a growing divergence in an age, outlook and interest between the great mass of Party members, only so recently recruited into the movement, and the little self-perpetuating clique of men at the top, whom most of these party members have never met, with whom they have never conversed, and with whom they can have no political intimacy.

Who can say whether, in these circumstances, the eventual rejuvenation of higher spheres of authority (which can only be a matter of time) can take place smoothly and peacefully, or whether rivals in the quest for higher power will not eventually reach down into these politically immature and inexperienced masses in order to find support for their respective claims? If this were ever to happen, strange consequences could flow for the Communist Party: for membership at large has been exercised only in practices of iron discipline and obedience and not in the arts of compromise and accommodation. And if disunity were ever to seize and paralyze the Party, the chaos and weakness of Russian society would be revealed in forms beyond description. For we have seen that Soviet power is only a crust concealing an amorphous mass of human beings among whom no independent organizational structure is tolerated. In Russia there is not even such a thing as local government. The present generation of Russians have never known spontaneity of collective action. If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies.

Thus the future of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure as Russian capacity for self-delusion would make it appear to the men in the Kremlin. That they can keep power themselves, they have demonstrated. That they can quietly and easily turn it over to others remains to be proved. Meanwhile, the hardships of their rule and the vicissitudes of international life have taken a heavy toll of the strength and hopes of the great people on whom their power rests. It is curious to note that the ideological power of Soviet authority is strongest today in areas beyond the frontiers of Russia, beyond the reach of its police power. This phenomenon brings to mind a comparison used by Thomas Mann in his great novel *Buddenbrooks*. Observing that human institutions often show the greatest outward brilliance at a moment when inner decay is in reality farther advanced, he compared the Buddenbrook family, in the days of its greatest glamour, to one of those stars whose light shines most brilliantly on this world when in reality it has long since ceased to exist. And who can say with assurance that the strong light still cast by the Kremlin on the dissatisfied peoples of the western world is not the powerful afterglow of a constellation which is in actuality on the wane? This cannot be proved. And it cannot be disproved. But the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced.

IV

It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalistic worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.

But in actuality the possibility for American policy are by no means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined. This is not only a question of the modest measure of informational

activity which this government can conduct in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, although that, too, is important. It is rather a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow's supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin's foreign policies. For the palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy. Even the failure of the United States to experience the early economic depression which the ravens of the Red Square have been predicting with such complacent confidence since hostilities ceased would have deep and important repercussions throughout the Communist world.

By the same token, exhibitions in indecision, disunity and internal disintegration within this country have an exhilarating effect on the whole Communist movement. At each evidence of these tendencies, a thrill of hope and excitement goes through the Communist world; a new jauntiness can be noted in the Moscow tread; new groups of foreign supporters climb on to what they can only view as the bandwagon of international politics; and Russian pressure increases all along the line in international affairs.

It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, Messianic movement — and particularly not that of the Kremlin — can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs.

Thus the decision will really fall in large measure in this country itself. The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the over-all worth of the United states as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.

Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.

Notes

"Concerning the Slogans of the United States of Europe," August 1915. Official Soviet edition of Lenin's works.

Here and elsewhere in this paper "Socialism" refers to Marxist or Leninist Communism, not to liberal Socialism of the Second International variety.

Russia: Sleeping Superpower?

Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

(The speech below, given in Washington, DC, on March 28, 2000, analyzes the current situation in Russia and outlines goals for U.S. policy towards Russia. Pickering was the U.S. Ambassador to Moscow from 1993-1996.)

Thank you very much for inviting me to be here this evening to kick off the Meridian House and Smithsonian lecture series, "Russia Revisited: The Sleeping Superpower?" It is a good time to review the scene, just two days after the Russian presidential elections.

The 3 1/2 years I spent in Russia from 1993-1996 were among the most fascinating in a long career in diplomacy. I hope that my time there, the thousands of miles traveled across that country's 11 time zones and visits to nearly 60 of the 89 equivalents to our states will help to provide some insight into our discussion of U.S. policy toward Russia.

The title of this seminar, "Russia—Sleeping Superpower?" gives you an idea of why we are all here together tonight. Even after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia is the largest country in the world, a bridge—or perhaps a divide—between Asia and Europe. Rich in natural resources, perhaps the richest in the world and with a skilled labor force, Russia has the potential to become a globally competitive market economy.

Russia's transition will take many years, and today Russia is at yet another crossroads in that process. Two days ago, the Russian people elected Vladimir Putin as the second President of the Russian Federation. Reflecting both his popularity and the lack of opponents of any stature, Putin won just over 52% of the vote.

Putin had the obvious advantage of incumbency, which he used to the utmost. There are also serious questions about manipulation of the media. Overall, however, there were no major election irregularities and, as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe noted, they did not affect the outcome of the elections.

The election also was interesting in that there was something of a cautionary voice expressed by some Russians in the larger-than-expected vote for Putin's primary opponent, Communist candidate Zyuganov, and because Putin's majority was a bit less than was expected. Whether they meant to or not, some Russians have sent a signal that all is not well and they will be watching closely what President Putin does. So will we.

But clearly, too, Putin has a mandate. There is no question that many Russians missed the absence of central control and welcomed the emergence of a strong leader. Thus far, it also seems that Putin has a more direct and straightforward rapport with the Russian people than did his predecessors. Since the election, he has acknowledged that the large vote for the Communists should be interpreted as a protest vote and that hard times are still ahead for Russia and Russians.

That level-headedness and openness are interesting indicators of how Putin may work with and for the Russian people.

The next critical question is, "What will he do with his mandate?" "Putin-ology" has become a cottage industry in Moscow and Washington. You only have to read the daily papers to know that. We've all heard about Putin as a KGB Lt. Colonel in the 1980s and Putin as St. Petersburg deputy mayor and reformer in the 1990s.

There is much talk of Putin's statements that Russia must be a strong state but little insight into what he means by all of this. Pundits are even analyzing the acting president's fascination with judo to predict what he will do.

Much of this speculation says a great deal more about the analyst than it does about the patient on the couch. The truth is that we don't yet know what kind of a president Vladimir Putin will be. While it flies in the face of our quick-to-judge, faster-to-act society, the course Putin will follow is not yet clear, and there is therefore more than a certain degree of "wait and see" necessary. But make no mistake—even as Putin's tenure begins, we actively are protecting our interests and seeking to influence events.

Once Putin is inaugurated, most likely on May 5th, he will formally nominate a Prime Minister and appoint a cabinet. In fact, reports today indicate that he may announce his choice for prime minister quite soon. The people he places in positions of responsibility will be among the early indicators of

where Putin intends to take Russia.

There is no doubt that the questions—and ultimately the answers—about Russia's new President are important. Putin is likely to be the single-most influential person in Russia, for perhaps the next 8 years if he wins a second term. But it also is important to remember that there are other factors at work as well. Other power centers are developing in Russia—the regions, the military, the oligarchs, even the much-maligned Russian Duma.

Decentralization is a matter of fact in Russia, with the regions gaining more autonomy. Over the last decade, regional governors have had to adjust as the center provided fewer subsidies but also less control. Governors, who are now elected rather than appointed, and elected local legislators have created their own political and commercial power bases with which Moscow has had to reckon.

Likewise, the Duma, while constitutionally far weaker than the presidency, has matured somewhat. The December parliamentary elections brought in more democrats, fewer radicals, and the Duma seems inclined to be more serious about the business of enacting legislation. That could be one salutary evolution with good effect for the days ahead.

Most important, the hallmarks of a democracy—free and fair elections, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, the rule of law, a civil society—are beginning now to take hold, although this process is very far from being complete.

Nevertheless, as these practices become stronger and institutionalized, any given individual will become less important. Russia would then have the time-honored institutions to fall back upon, not one person making a decision today that could be reversed easily tomorrow. These new institutions also will make it harder for the corrupt to compete. This in itself will be a welcome change.

Sunday's presidential elections mark Russia's first democratic transfer of power in its 1,000-year history. One of the most overlooked facts about this election is that democratic elections are becoming unchallenged in Russia as the way to select leaders. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, there have been three nationwide Duma elections and now two presidential elections, not to mention hundreds of regional and local elections. Almost all of them passed without significant complaints of malfeasance.

When former President Yeltsin resigned, he appointed Putin as Acting President and presidential elections were called. This is the procedure as outlined in the Russian Constitution. There was certainly criticism that the system was being manipulated to Putin's advantage, but no one questioned the constitutionality of the process or tried to come to power by other means. This is a significant development in a country that not 10 years ago was a communist country in which people had no say about who their leaders would be and in which the decision process itself was shrouded in mystery.

Another overlooked development is Russia's progress toward developing a civil society, particularly outside the major cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. This is something that was evident to me in my travels in Russia 4 years ago, and I think it is even more evident now.

Russia today boasts 65,000 non-governmental organizations, up from just a handful a decade ago.

For those of us who live in the United States, it is hard to understand what a profound development this truly is. But imagine America with only the government and a few private businesses—no American Cancer Society, no animal shelters, no women's shelters, no Boy Scouts or Girl- Scouts, no foundations, no lobbyists, no Smithsonian or Meridian House to bring you these lectures.

Such organizations of a free and civil society affect all of our lives, every day. In Russia, they are starting to do so as well.

That is where the real change is taking place in Russia. And as individuals get used to the idea of taking control of their lives and their communities, it is the insurance policy that Russia can never go back to what it was before.

Such changes are reflected in other areas as well. Private business is expanding and some is flourishing despite the severe economic hardships after the collapse of the ruble in August 1998. Try to imagine a state without individual initiative in the area of business and competition. This, too, is a welcome and potentially very significant change.

But let me also be clear on another important point. Russia is still very much a work in progress. No one is under the illusion that Russia's path to democracy and a full market economy is getting any easier. And we realize that Russian transformation is

not a matter of months or years but something that probably will take decades and generations.

I think it is worthwhile to turn for a moment to Russia's economy, where the transition from a state run to a market driven system has been slow and has disappointed many—not the least of which is Russia's own population. It is clear now that this process will take longer than any of us thought.

This is most telling in the economic conditions under which many Russians find themselves now today. More than 35 percent of the population lives on just over $1.00 a day. Inflation is down from 80 percent in 1998, which is truly good news, but still reached 36 percent in 1999, which truly is not good news.

These figures are discouraging for what they suggest about the possibilities for consumer spending and investment, as well as the effects of such poverty on the public's faith in the new economy, on its health, infrastructure, and social institutions. Social services and education suffer from years of budgetary neglect.

Still, Russians are looking forward, not back to staid communist ideals, for their economic future. Equally important to note is that the economic indicators are beginning to show some signs of recovery. GDP, industrial production, and the trade surplus all grew in 1999, while the budget deficit, wage arrearages, and unemployment declined.

President Putin already has announced that one of his key objectives will be to improve the standard of living under which Russians are living. In that regard, he has said that the government will pay its employees back wages as of April 1. Such steps are important, particularly if they prove to be the beginning of a new way of doing business and of an approach to governance and the economy in which the people at large benefit, not just the oligarchs. And of course, you can imagine what it has been like in a country such as Russia when arrearages have gone back many months—and you can imagine what would occur if that happened in our country.

In addition, high oil prices and a weak ruble could mean a higher growth rate in Russia in 2000. If this were accompanied by controlled spending and long-needed economic reforms, it could lay the groundwork for longer-term growth.

The economic course is Putin's to set, and it will be a mark both of his commitment to reform and of his ability to influence the Duma. The next steps in Russia's political and economic transition will require continued dedication on the part of Russia's leaders and patience on the part of its people.

It will require the same of American officials and the American public. We need to remember that they (and we) are in this for the long haul—not just for today's headline. And I hope we have now put the "Who Lost Russia?" debate behind us. Secretary Albright I think said it best last fall when she said "the suggestion made by some that Russia is ours to lose is arrogant; the suggestion that Russia is lost is simply wrong."

But the hearts and minds of Chechnya's people, both Russians and Chechens, are Russia's to lose. I frankly must tell you how disheartened I was when fighting in Chechnya began again last autumn. I lived through the previous conflict and saw its divisive toll not only in the Caucasus but throughout Russian society.

We don't dispute Russia's right to fight terrorism on its own soil. An armed incursion by Chechen separatists into Dagestan last August and apartment bombings may be the events that triggered the current fighting.

That, however, does not excuse the Russian Government's decision to use massive military force against civilians inside Chechnya. The numbers speak for themselves: 200,000 people displaced, thousands of innocent civilians dead or wounded, and thousands of homes and businesses destroyed since last September.

It will take decades and millions of dollars to rebuild Chechnya. Moreover, allegations about atrocities by Russian forces have raised questions about the Russian Government's commitment to human rights and international norms.

Likewise, the Russian Government's decision to clamp down on the media's ability to cover the conflict and its treatment of Radio Liberty's Andrei Babitsky have raised questions about its commitment to freedom of the press.

I hope that Russia will move quickly to investigate these allegations in concert with the international community and to protect all of its citizens and their basic freedoms as enshrined in Russia's Constitution.

The U.S. raises our concerns about Chechnya at every opportunity we have to talk with Russians, from

the President on down. Slowly, the West is making some progress. In the fall, the efforts of the U.S. and others were instrumental in gaining access for international donors to the region and possibly in averting a humanitarian disaster.

Putin has said he does not want Russia to be isolated internationally. He has also stated that he sees Russia as a part of Europe. We need to keep raising Chechnya with the Russians, to keep moving them in the right direction on Chechnya and toward the international norms of the global community.

What does the U.S. want the Russians to do now? Here are a few of our thoughts:

Let the International Red Cross come back in to deal with detained and displaced people;

Let the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's assistance mission return to deal with human rights monitoring and humanitarian relief;

Let the Council of Europe provide its expertise to the staff of Russia's Human Rights Ombudsman Kalamanov to investigate the allegations of atrocities; and

Let Russians begin to explore with Chechens the development of a political settlement.

With the fighting in Chechnya, many Americans naturally ask why their government remains committed to engagement with Russia. The answer is a simple one: because the policy of engagement with Russia advances the safety and security of the American people. This is our enduring national security interest beyond the disagreements and the disappointments of the moment.

For much of the past 50 years, Russia and the United States have been adversaries. That era happily has now passed. Despite the well-known areas of disagreement with Russia, the end of the Cold War has meant a more constructive relationship, whether one measures our bilateral cooperation on reducing nuclear weapons material or our cooperation internationally or the growing ties among our citizens and business people.

As Russia continues its journey from communism, we need actively to engage Russia so that it becomes a productive member of the world community.

Since the Cold War ended, the U.S. has pursued three overriding goals in its relationship with Russia: The first is to increase the safety of the American people by working to reduce Cold War arsenals, stop proliferation, and create a stable and undivided Europe. The second is to work with Russia internationally, and the third is to support Russia's effort to transform its political, economic, and social institutions at home.

It is crystal clear why we work so hard on arms control and non-proliferation. Why we care what kind of a country Russia becomes is sometimes less obvious, but it comes down to the same thing: U.S. national security interests.

A Russia that boasts a healthy economy, strong institutions, and a political system that works is a country that understands that future progress depends not on dominating others but on forging economic and political partnerships in the global community. To paraphrase Prime Minister Thatcher, that would be a Russia we can do business with.

And there is no downside. The zero-sum world of the Cold War is gone; we have nothing to lose by a Russia that is economically and politically strong and confident about its own security, and we have everything to gain by a Russia that can be a full partner in the world community.

Furthermore, a stable, prosperous, and democratic Russia is much more likely to be a good partner on arms control and questions of international security and peace.

Let me tell you concretely the kinds of things we have done with Russia over the past 8 years to protect and build your security.

The United States has helped deactivate almost 5,000 nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union, removed nuclear weapons from three countries (Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan), destroyed hundreds of missiles, bombers, and ballistic missile submarines that once targeted our country, strengthened the security of nuclear weapons and materials at more than 50 sites, helped put in place barriers against illicit trafficking in weapons materials and technologies, and purchased more than 80 tons of highly enriched uranium—enough to make more than 3,000 nuclear warheads. We will be using it to make electricity in our nuclear power plants and we have an agreement to purchase a total of 500 tons over 15 years with an option to increase that amount later.

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That kind of cooperation is also evident in the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative, which will help Russia tighten export controls, improve security over its existing weapons of mass destruction, and provide increased opportunities for thousands of former Soviet weapons scientists to participate in peaceful commercial and research activities.

To combat nuclear proliferation, the U.S. and Russia have been partners in developing the foundations of a stronger international non-proliferation regime, based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The U.S. policy of engagement is also designed to help Russians build the prosperous and democratic country that will be America's partner in meeting the challenges ahead in this century.

U.S. assistance programs have brought more than 35,000 young Russians to the U.S. for training, they have helped 275,000 Russian small businessmen with financing or training, and they have reached out to 300 independent TV stations in Russia's provinces.

Russia and America also have common interests on many international issues. Last year alone, Russian and American soldiers stood side-by-side to keep the peace in Bosnia and Kosovo, our diplomats helped negotiate the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe signed by 53 members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and our scientists worked to ensure that Y2K brought no nuclear mishaps.

Our policy of engagement also means that we engage in areas where we have strong disagreements. This is what grabs the headlines and for many becomes the entirety of the relationship.

Indeed, the relationship has had its share of very heavy weather over the past year—between Kosovo and Chechnya and our deep concerns about Russian support for missile and nuclear projects in Iran.

But I also want to point out that during the Kosovo campaign, when media pundits were predicting the absolute end of the relationship, we were quietly continuing our work on other issues.

During this period, we concluded agreements on the framework for the historic CFE Adaptation Treaty, negotiated a Civil Air Agreement, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, and the list goes on.

Are all of these issues headliners? No. But, for example, it is crucially important to the airline industry—and all the companies that depend on them and all of you who travel—that we have a Civil Air Agreement..

As for Kosovo, despite virulent debate, the Russians proved to be instrumental in the diplomatic solution that brought an end to the military action. Cooperation on the ground between Russian and other KFOR troops remains excellent. The military-to-military relationship and the NATO-Russia relationship are both getting back on track now, too, and the U.S., Russia, and others are meeting today in Europe in the Contact Group to chart a future course together in Kosovo.

It is the hallmark of a mature relationship that even when two countries profoundly disagree they can still do business together. Both Russia and the United States recognize that it just makes more sense to engage: We simply have too many interests in common—political, security, cultural, and commercial—to do otherwise. And we can engage in a mature way, without linking progress in one area to progress in all others. It is in our common interest to cooperate where we can and to manage our differences where we cannot.

In the wake of the weekend elections, Russians face decisions on critical issues from the economy to Chechnya. A young and vigorous President is about to lead Russia into the new millennium. He is different from his predecessors—who exhibited bold strokes of bravery at key points in the break up of the former Soviet Union. He came to power through the ballot box in a country already 7 years old. He now will have to make happen what his predecessors' bold decisions made possible.

Putin will be judged at home in large measure on his willingness and ability to implement economic and political reform and restore the confidence of the citizenry in the state and in the economy.

He will be judged by the world by how he deals with the country's internal instabilities, how he engages with weak neighbors across Russia's borders, and the role that Russia chooses to play internationally, as well as by his own personal skill at furthering Russia's economic and political reform.

Today, the question of "Whither Russia" is very much on America's mind, whether one is in business, government, or academia. It is, of course, a question whose answer does not lie in Washington; the answer

lies instead with Russia and in the decisions that the new government will make.

The problems that need to be addressed are clear: Will the new government create a positive, fair, and transparent business climate? Will it tap the immense ingenuity of the Russian people and strengthen its democracy? Will Russia make the changes that will inspire its own people as well as the international community to invest in that economy?

We don't know where Russia will go. That is Russia's choice to make. But as Secretary Albright stated recently, "All we can be sure of now is that the result will be distinctively Russian. And that it will depend ultimately far less on decrees handed down in Moscow . . . than on the decisions made and opinions formed in Russia's classrooms, farms, factories, and living rooms."

No shadows hide the problems Russia must face, but it is equally true that no every-day adversity can diminish the extraordinary potential of that land and people. We here today share an admiration and a hope for Russia, even as we know clearly its problems and remain in awe of its potential.

The United States welcomes its new relationship with Russia and strongly believes that a healthy relationship between our two countries is the best course. Each thereby is made more secure, and our citizens and business people are given more opportunity.

The relationship will be stronger if Russia completes its democratic and economic transition. We can play a constructive role to help that happen. It is clearly in our interest to do so and for our government and people and country to be part of that process.

Thank you all.

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